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ABSTRACT 
 
TITLE: Excess Cash Best In Class? Which Firms Managed Better Stock Returns During The 
Financial Crisis? 
AUTHORS: Cavdarovski Jove and Ragnvid Martin 
SUPERVISOR: Vilhelmsson Anders 
SEMINAR DATE: 26th of May, 2014  
RESEARCH QUESTION: How well do U.S. diversified firms perform on the stock markets, 
relative to their U.S. focused cash-rich peers? Further, is the relative performance contingent on 
the state of the economy? 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK: Free Cash Flow Hypothesis, Precautionary Motive, 
Transaction Motive, Long Purse Hypothesis, Real Options, Agency Theory, Market Frictions, 
Internal Capital Markets, Debt Co-Insurance, Diversification Discount. 
METHOD: Quantitative approach, using multiple regressions for determining excess cash. 
Further, measuring abnormal stock returns with the help of Jensen´s Alpha and dividing firms 
into portfolios. 
CONCLUSIONS: During the normal periods in absence of crisis, diversified firms without any 
excess cash as a whole, outperformed focused firms holding excess cash. During the Financial 
Crisis from mid 2007 to early 2009 on the other hand, focused firms holding excess cash 
outperformed less diversified firms and diversified firms as a group, where diversified firms with 
more than 2 SIC codes performed equally good compared to focused firms with excess cash. 
Main reasons include lower positive skewness and higher leverage in diversified firms, while 
higher capital expenditures in focused firms are deemed as factor for focused firms with excess 
cash.  
KEY WORDS: Excess Cash, Diversification, Abnormal Returns, SIC-codes, Financial Crisis
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
In this first chapter, the background and further problem discussions related to the topic are given. The 
research purpose is then defined. The chapter ends with a short delimitation and a thesis outline. 
  
1.1. BACKGROUND 
In 2006, non-financial and non-utility firms in the U.S. held aggregate cash holdings, i.e. cash 
and short-term investments, of amazing $ 1.7 trillion1 (Duchin, 2010). According to Bates, Kahle 
and Stulz (2007), the average cash-to-asset ratio for industrial firms in the U.S. increased by a 
total of 129 percent from 1980 to 2004. Ever since Modigliani and Miller´s influential paper 
from 1958, about the irrelevance of firm capital structure, this has been a hot topic among 
academics and practitioners in corporate finance and management. In (ideal) perfect capital 
markets, capital structure is indeed irrelevant. However, in reality, markets are affected by 
imperfections, such as information asymmetries, agency problems, transaction costs, costs of 
financial distress, et cetera. These imperfections drive some firms to hold substantial amounts of 
cash on their balance sheets (Ferreira and Vilela, 2004). 
Holding large amounts of cash is a way for managers to reduce the risks of financial distress 
arising from unsuspected future events and external shocks. This was first coined as the 
precautionary savings theory by John Maynard Keynes back in 1936, who argued that firms 
stack money during good times for the purpose of having an extra cash cushion in worse times. 
This allows them not to miss out on important investment opportunities during economic 
downturns. However, holding a substantial amount of excess cash on the balance sheet can also 
give rise to a number of potential risks; management might, for example, use cash for their own 
perquisites, and overinvest in poor projects that instead reduce the value of the firm (Jensen, 
1986). 
Another hot topic in corporate finance is corporate diversification strategy, i.e. segmental and/or 
geographical diversification, which allows firms to spread their operating and/or financial risks 
across different segments and geographies with imperfectly correlated cash flows (e.g. 
conglomerates such as General Electrics). Here is another way for firms to reduce the risks 
                                                
1 Equals more than Germany´s total state budget for 2013 (CIA World Factbook, 2013) 
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arising from future unexpected events. “Don´t put all your eggs in one basket”2 is a frequently 
used phrase in the world of finance. Conglomerates, two or more companies engaged in 
completely different businesses but members of the same corporate group, were particularly 
common during the 1960s and 1970s (Kuppuswamy and Villalonga, 2010). Under the 1980s and 
1990s there were more negative views on conglomerates, and many were therefore dismantled 
(ibid.). However, some researchers believe conglomerates have the potential of making a 
comeback after these last periods of financial crisis (Rudolph and Schwetzler, 2013).  
Diversification enables firms to get access to an internal capital market between their different 
segments, which can be used for investments (Higgins and Schall, 1975). According to the 
literature, this internal capital market is one of the strongest reasons for firms to diversify, since 
it can reduce transaction costs and costs of information asymmetry related to external financing 
(Stein 1997; Doukas and Kan 2008). However, diversification might also be driven by 
opportunistic purposes, managerial empire building and entrenchment (e.g. Jensen and Meckling 
1976; Jensen 1986; Shleifer and Vishny 1989). This managerial behaviour can become value 
decreasing for the firm and its shareholders. After all, shareholders can diversify away the 
idiosyncratic risk on their own by going straight to the capital markets, investing in a portfolio of 
imperfectly correlated stocks3 (Koller, Goedhart and Wessels, 2010). 
1.2. PROBLEM DISCUSSION 
There is an extensive literature on the impact of firms’ excess cash holdings and diversification. 
Researchers in the field of corporate finance have for decades tried to determine both the benefits 
and the disadvantages of excess cash holdings and firm diversification.  
Starting off with the literature in excess cash. Miller and Modigliani (1961) present their ideas 
regarding frictionless financial markets, where firms regardless of the market conditions, can 
adjust their capital structure and therefore, have a completely costless financial flexibility when 
                                                
2 According to the Ecclesiastes, one of the 24 books that make up the old testament, in ca. 950 BC King Solomon gave his 
recommendation to diversify with his words: “give a portion to seven, or even to eight, for you know not what disaster may 
happen on earth”. 
3 Corporate diversification is analogues to portfolio diversification in Modern Portfolio Theory (MPT) introduced by Harry 
Markowitz in the fifties (Markowitz, 1952). The risk in a portfolio of securities is increasingly reduced the more the securities are 
negatively correlated with each other, and hence, have a negative correlation coefficient (ρi,j). This can be seen by the variance 
formula for a portfolio of two securities: σp2 = wi2 σi2 + wj2 σj2 + 2 wi wj σi σj ρ i,j where σp2 stands for the portfolio variance, 
wi and wj are the security weights in the portfolio, σi and σj is security volatility while ρ i,j is the correlation coefficient between 
them. Negative correlation will thus reduce the total idiosyncratic risk stemming from the securities. 
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investing, which makes excess cash holding irrelevant. However, market financial frictions are 
common in the real world. Denis (2011) claimed that cash holding should be seen as something 
positive when the firm faces higher costs on external capital markets in periods of a financial 
crisis. This is also consistent with prior studies from Denis and Sibilkov (2010); Faulkender and 
Wang (2006); Pinkowitz et al. (2006); who show a higher marginal value of cash holdings for 
constrained firms with higher external cost of capital, compared to firms with low costs for 
external financing. Keynes (1936) argue that both transaction cost motives and precautionary 
motives favour cash holdings, arguments that Meltzer (1963); Frazer (1964); Miller and Orr 
(1966); Vogel and Maddala (1967); later also agreed on4.  
The Long Purse hypothesis is another motive for stacking excess cash, since it might benefit 
firms with predation behaviour, to run constrained competitors out of business (Bolton and 
Scharfstein, 1990). Cossin and Hricko (2000) argue that holding cash can be seen as a real option 
with timing effects, which allows managers to hold on their investments to the right time. Jensen 
(1986) on the other hand, argues for the Free Cash Flow hypothesis, i.e. that managers with large 
excess cash invest in value destroying properties. These findings are acknowledged by Harford 
(1999), Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2007), and Harford et. al. (2008).  
However Tong (2011) and Duchin (2010) show that cash holding is highly dependent on firms´ 
grade of diversification. Tong argues that the value of holding cash decreases significantly when 
firms go from focused to more diversified. Duchin (2010) finds that multi-segment firms 
optimally hold half as much cash as focused single-segment firms, while Subramaniam, Tang, 
Yue, and Zhou, (2011) argue that this can be traced to two hypotheses. First, diversified firms 
might be able to reduce the level of financing frictions, and thus large cash holding might be less 
beneficial for these firms. Second, agency problems in diversified firms may well be correlated 
with the multidivisional firm structure and thus lower the value of cash holding.  
If then turning the attention to diversified firms, Chandler (1977) presents the visible hand, 
which suggests that value creation through production can be obtained more efficiently in 
multidivisional, in contrast to stand-alone firms. Stulz (1990) and Stein (1997) on the other hand 
                                                
4 There is also the third motive, called the speculations motive; firms stack cash in order to speculate in interest rates, exchange 
rates and price fluctuations on products and commodities. 
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argue that a larger internal capital market gives managers a real option5 and an opportunity of 
“winner picking,” i.e. to allocate internal funds within the firm in such way that those divisions 
that are believed to be able to generate profitable investments, also receive the most funds. Thus, 
it would reduce underinvestment problems in the profitable divisions, resulting in increased 
value for the shareholders.  
Matsusaka and Nande (2002), Dimitrov and Tice (2006) and Yan, Yang and Jiao (2009) argue 
that investments in financially constrained diversified firms are less affected by credit shocks in 
the external capital market, compared to focused firms. Their results are explained with 
diversified firms´ smaller dependence of external capital markets, due to their ability to finance 
investments with the help of internal capital allocations within the firm. Hence, they can 
substitute internal capital for more costly external capital. These findings are also in line with 
Gertler and Gilchrist (1994), Kashyap, Lamont, Stein (1994), and Almeida and Campello (2007) 
who argue that firms with reduced access to capital markets also exhibit larger investment 
sensibility in credit market conditions.  
Stulz (1990) have more negative explanations as to why firms choose to diversify. He argues that 
firms make investments in different business segments with inferior potential and thus destroy 
shareholder value. This was something Rajan, Servaes and Zingales (2000); Gertner, Powers and 
Scharfstein (1999); Scharfstein, (1998); Shin and Stulz (1998); Scharfstein and Stein (2000) refer 
to as socialism within diversified firms due to cross-subsidization issues. Jensen (1986) also 
predict the same value destroying behaviour, and that diversified firms invest more in projects 
with negative NPV than stand-alone focused firms, due to agency problems. Meyer, Milgrom, 
and Roberts (1992) also claim that diversified firms´ cross subsidization can result in 
unprofitable divisions being kept, which would not be the case if the division was a stand-alone, 
separately from the firm. Shleifer and Vishny (1989) discuss entrenchment difficulties and 
managerial desecrations related to diversification, and argue that managers in diversified firms 
are entrenched by the diversification due to manager-specific investments, and, therefore, appear 
to be more valuable for shareholders. The replacement of them can thus be more costly for the 
firm. 
                                                
5 Real options refer to the flexibility in decision-making, regarding an option to respond, react or postpone upcoming events or 
investment decisions (Trigeorgis, 1996). 
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Prior research has mainly been focused in determining the reasons for, and the effects of, firms´ 
diversification and excess cash holdings. It has also largely been built on variables that measure 
internal value creation from a managerial perspective, such as investments by diversified or cash-
rich firms, the marginal value of excess cash holding, and the efficiency of internal capital 
markets in diversified firms. Even though there is a positive relationship between internal value 
creation from a management point of view, and external value creation from an investor point of 
view, less focus has been on the latter. Admittedly, some studies have found that firms with these 
two characteristics trade at discounts in the capital markets due to the negative effects mentioned 
above while other studies also answer whether diversification-discount firms have higher 
expected returns than their focused peers in order to compensate investors for offering less 
upside potential (Mitton and Vorkink, 2010). Prior research has also indicated that these two firm 
types could be beneficial during uncertain economic conditions (Rudolph and Schwetzler, 2013; 
Stone and Gup, 2013); Kuppuswamy and Villalonga, 2010; Harford, Mikkelson and Partch, 
2003). However, to the best of our knowledge, there is no prior study that focuses on the 
comparison of these two firm types and how they impact firms’ stock returns in different states 
of the economy. 
With the above-mentioned one can conclude that there is a research gap that needs to be filled. 
With regards to the distinction in previous research between focused firms that hold large 
amounts of excess cash, and diversified firms that generally hold less cash, it has not previously 
been measured how these firm characteristics perform relatively on the stock markets, prior, after 
and under the 2007-2009 Financial Crisis. It is thus interesting to explore whether one type of 
firm manages higher stock returns than the other type of firm, and if this outcome changes during 
the crisis period.  
1.3. RESEARCH QUESTIONS  
The purpose of this study is thus to answer the question: 
↪ How well do U.S. diversified firms perform on the stock markets, relative to U.S. focused 
cash-rich firms? Further, is the relative performance contingent on the state of the 
economy?   
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1.4. DELIMITATIONS 
Due to time limitations for data treatment, this study has only focused on firms traded on the 
U.S. stock exchanges. The study is also limited to segmental diversification, and has not focused 
on geographical diversification6.  
1.5. OUTLINE 
The remainder of this thesis is structured in the following way: 
• Litterateur review: The reader will be guided through some of the relevant theoretical 
frameworks, literature and models connected to this field of research. 
• Method: A thorough review, where the reader gets a deep overview of the methods and 
preferences that forms the foundation of the research.  
• Empirical Analysis: The results from the research are presented together with a brief 
review of those previous papers consistent with the result.  
• Analysis and discussion: These results are then analysed more deeply and put into their 
context, with the help of relevant literature.  
• Conclusions: A short conclusion is presented and a proposal for further research is given. 
 
  
                                                
6 The literature on geographic diversification is quite scarce, probably due to the low quality of data (Erdorf et al, 2013). 
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2. LITERATURE REVIEW & HYPOTHESES  
  
In this chapter, some of the relevant literature and theoretical frameworks for the thesis are reviewed. 
Starting off with the literature in excess cash holding and diversification, the chapter then aims to give an 
understanding of the model used for measuring abnormal stock returns. Finally, the hypotheses are 
presented and motivated.   
 
2.1. MOTIVES FOR EXCESS CASH HOLDINGS 
Cash holdings in firms have been a widely discussed subject among academics. Miller and 
Modigliani (1961) suggested that cash holdings are irrelevant since one could expect frictionless 
financial markets, where firms, regardless of the market conditions, could adjust their capital 
structure and therefore have a costless financial flexibility for when to invest. This means that 
cash holding is irrelevant and one can expect firms to hold minimum amounts of cash. However, 
financial frictions in the market are present and cash holdings on the balance sheet can vary in 
over time and in different states of the economy. See figure in appendix 1 for an illustration of 
the cash-to-assets ratio in U.S. firms during 1990 - 2006. To provide readers a more extensive 
knowledge on how excess cash has introduces for both harmful behaviour but also useful real 
options in decision-making, the following section will provide some of the most important 
reasons from prior research to distinguish between firms´ choice of holding excess cash during 
different states of the economy. 
2.1.1. PRECAUTIONARY MOTIVE 
One of the oldest writings regarding cash holdings is Modigliani and Miller´s paper about 
Precautionary Motive, where cash serves as a safety margin and a financial reserve for 
unexpected future events. It is, however, often confused with Real Option theory where the 
difference lies in how these two theories look at cash holdings. Real Option focuses on the firm's 
option to defer investment at the right time while the precautionary motive emphasis on a 
strategic motive to reduce threats in financing due to a downturn in the financial markets. One 
may therefore see precautionary motive as part of a strategy to tackle threats of liquidity when 
markets face financial downturns, and thus it helps explain why some firms prefers to hold large 
amount of excess cash. Excess cash thus functions as a protecting shield against cash flows 
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shocks when idiosyncratic cash flow volatility increases. Bates, Kahle and Stulz (2009) provided 
evidence for these theories and showed how firms with higher idiosyncratic cash flow volatility 
also increased their cash compared to those firms who faced the smallest increase in 
idiosyncratic cash flow volatility. Opler, Pinkowitz, Stulz, and Williamson (1999) finds that 
firms who face limited market access to external financing together with risky cash flows also try 
to mitigate this with larger cash holdings. Furthermore, they also suggest a motive for their 
precautionary behaviour and argue that these motives are greatest in downturns when firms face 
high uncertainties and those uncertainties may be costly for firms with larger investment 
opportunities. One might, therefore, assume larger cash holdings in recent year due to the latest 
Financial Crisis. 
Also, it may not be obvious, but a negative correlation between cash holding and firms´ ability to 
raise external financing during downturns in the economy might also very well be assumed. One 
may therefore expect constrained firms to face greater difficulties reaching outside capital 
relatively less constrained firms. Han and Qiu (2007) prove this argument and find that 
constrained firms with volatile cash flows also exhibit a greater propensity of large cash holding 
compared to less constrained firm. This would prove a negative correlation between constrained 
firms cash flows and the volatility in these cash flows and thus provide a further explanation for 
the willingness of firms to hold cash. Irvine and Pontiff (2008) also suggest that larger cash 
holding can be explained by higher cash flow volatility through higher idiosyncratic risk. Such 
increase would then also be related to the higher volatility in unhedged risks. 
2.1.2. REAL OPTIONS 
Real options can be seen as the manager’s flexibility with respect to future decision-making, 
where this flexibility also generates some value creation for the firms’ investors. Furthermore to 
understand the value creation, one also needs to understand the underlying components in the 
option. The first component is the intrinsic value, better known as NPV of all future cash flows, 
while the second component is the time value. The difference between simple NPV calculations 
and real options is that NPV calculations ignore the options time value, also known as the 
flexibility, and hence its value to either cash in or cash out (Barbosa, Carvalho, Pereira, 2013). 
This flexibility in manager’s decision-making refers to different options to respond, react or 
postpone upcoming events or investment decisions in the upcoming future. Barbosa, Carvalho 
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and Pereira (2013) further suggest that time value is highly dependent of the uncertainty 
regarding the investment, where higher uncertainty also tends to give managers options to 
postpone investment until more information is available and thus result in a more secure 
decision-making. One can, therefore, assume that real options flexibility and time value can be 
more valuable during downturns in credit markets when firms become more constrained and lack 
external financing options and thus also depend more on internal funding solutions. An 
assumption Inklaar and Yang (2012) confirms. Cash holding will in this case help avoid this 
problem and thus not force firms to more expensive financing solutions. This can also be 
assumed to explain the theoretical reasons why firms sit on large cash holdings instead of 
investing them or pay them out as dividends. Cossin and Hricko also argue that information 
asymmetry can create misevaluation and under-pricing in security issuance, which can make 
external financing even more expensive due to a misprice premium. Kisser (2013) on the other 
hand, suggests that firms with large cash holdings also have the possibility to postpone 
investments, however, incentives of delaying investments can be seen as extra strong during 
times when cash flow volatility or investment costs are low. 
2.1.3. LONG PURSE & FEAR OF FIRE SALES 
Another theory for cash holdings is the so-called long purse (or “deep-pockets”) theory of 
corporate predatory pricing (Telser, 1966; McGee, 1958). In industries characterized with high 
rivalry, cash-rich firms can drive their financially constrained competitors out of business by 
reducing their cash flows. This is done by cutting the prices of their products and thus lowering 
price levels in their industry, to such levels where the constrained firm cannot continue to 
operate. This leads the constrained firm to bankruptcy, whereby the cash-rich firm then raises the 
prices and enjoys a monopoly on the market (op cit). This strategy can of course also work as 
intimidation against new industry entrants. An interesting example is the German retail chain for 
consumer electronics, Media Markt, which allegedly according to the tabloids had this strategy 
during its expansion on the Swedish market (Expressen, 2010). 
Cash holdings are also connected to firms´ assets; Usman (2013) found that firms that have 
highly liquid assets tend to substitute cash holdings with these assets. In this case, the liquid 
assets can serve as a backup as asset sales when the firm faces an external shock. This presumes 
that the firm is confident that the assets can be sold to a fair value; Shleifer and Vishny (1992) 
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finds that when a constrained firm is forced to sell its assets because of financial distress in their 
industry, non-constrained players from outside the industry will step in and bid lower prices for 
these assets. The constrained firm is thus forced to make a fire sale. 
2.1.4. TRANSACTION MOTIVE 
Keynes (1936) transaction motive for holding cash is based on the view that cash-rich firms hold 
large amounts of cash, due to their relatively high costs of converting cash substitutes (assets) 
into cash, or alternatively raising funds on outside capital markets (Opler et. al., 1999). The firm 
needs liquidity for its daily operations and transactions, however, since raising funds is 
connected with high costs, it prefers to hold liquid asset holdings as a safeguard. These liquid 
asset holdings increase with factors that make the marginal cost of being illiquid, i.e. short of 
funding: 
• Transactions costs of raising outside funds, e.g. underwriting fees, legal fees. 
• Costs of raising funds through asset sales, dividend cuts, and renegotiation, e.g. firm-
specific assets are harder to liquidate. 
• Risk of giving up investment opportunities due to cash shortage. 
• Costs of hedging instruments, i.e. high costs for hedging may raise the need for cash as 
backup.  
• Length of cash conversion cycle, e.g. firms with low inventory/sales ratio needs less cash. 
• Cash flow uncertainty, e.g. uncertainty in revenues. 
• Absence of economies of scale in cash management, e.g. administrative costs. 
A firm must therefore determine their optimal level of cash based on the marginal costs and 
marginal benefits of having excess cash (op.cit.). The marginal costs in this case refer to the 
lower expected returns from liquid assets, e.g. short-term interest rate, instead of investing it in 
profitable projects. One can therefore assume that different levels of excess cash also have 
different implications on firm value. 
2.1.5. AGENCY PROBLEMS 
When managers face lack of investment opportunities but hold a large stack of excess cash, 
managers often have different options. One option is to pay out a large one-time dividend and let 
shareholders invest in more value creating projects. Other possibilities might be to buy back 
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shares, which also can be a good thing for shareholder wealth. However Jensen and Meckling 
(1976) also see other issues and introduce agency problems, which mainly can be referred to as a 
conflict between firms’ managers and shareholders or stakeholder. Jensen and Meckling argue 
that managers whose job is to maximize shareholder value rather come up with incentives to 
maximize their own welfare and mitigate their own problems, which not necessarily is in line 
with shareholder value maximization. Potential interpretation from an investor’s point of view 
might therefore be that the market might punish firms with large excess cash holdings due to 
negative expectations, thereby providing negative return for shareholders in contrast to its true 
value.  
Later on, Jensen (1986) introduced his Free Cash Flow hypothesis to explain this behaviour for 
firms with large cash holding. Jensen meant that managers show entrenched behaviour and in 
times of poor investment opportunities, managers try to maintain a steady cash holding instead of 
increasing dividends to their shareholders. The reason is that these kinds of payments rather 
reduce their ability to invest in new projects without transparency, since internal financing is 
difficult for the market to monitor. Instead, they have to ask the market for external capital when 
they find an interesting project, which gives rise to a greater monitoring opportunity for the 
market and damages their ability to keep up with their empire building.  
Pinkowitz, Stulz and Williamson (2006) continue and suggest that managers in firms that 
suffered from poor investor protection also are expected to hold larger amount of cash, since 
managers in these firms also have more incentives in their decision-making for gaining control of 
the firm. Other suggestions from recent research imply that excess cash in firms with poor 
governance are valued below their true value. This is something Dittmar, Mahrt-Smith, and 
Servaes (2003) previously also had concluded when they pointed out managers’ self-serving 
behaviour as extra severe in poor governance firms. Harford (1999) on the other hand suggests 
that this is not a characteristic due to poor governance but rather a characteristic in all 
corporations when shareholders also are well protected.  
Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2007) argue that this problem will result in a devaluation7 of cash, 
where cash holding is valued at a discount for poorly controlled entities. Dittmar and Mahrt-
                                                
7 Pinkowitz, Stulz, and Williamson (2006) show that an extra dollar only is worth $0.33 in firms with poor governance, but  
$0.91 in firms with adequate firm governance.   
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Smith suggest that this is due to market confidence in the managers’ behaviour and predictions 
of value-destroying interactions rather than value creation. Other research that contributes to 
more insights on agency problem, see Stulz (1990); Aggarwal and Samwick (2003); Staglianó, 
La Rocca and La Rocca (2013). As seen, firms with bad governance and large excess cash 
holding might therefore be assumed to introduce a price discount on the firms stock, to the extent 
that expectations of the firms management is negatively correlated with the firms excess cash 
holdings due to lack of monitoring possibilities for external share- and stakeholders.  
2.1.6. EXCESS CASH AND STOCK RETURNS 
On the other hand, Simutin (2010) explores whether firms with large excess cash holdings 
perform better on the stock market, during all states in the economy. Intuitively, in periods of a 
financial crisis and overall economic downturn, having a cash cushion may prove valuable and 
should be reflected in higher stock returns for these firms. However, Simutin finds that firms 
with high excess cash actually underperform their low excess cash peers. One probable 
explanation for this finding is that excess cash holdings correlate with growth opportunities and 
that these opportunities lose their value during periods of crisis. Excess cash, which therefore, is 
associated with future investments and future expected returns, lose its value as investors see it 
as redundant if the economy is in crisis and hence investment opportunities are unclear. The 
opposite applies during normal periods, i.e. firms with excess cash outperform their cash poor 
peers (op. cit.). 
2.2. MOTIVES FOR DIVERSIFICATION 
2.2.1. EFFECT ON FIRM VALUE: DIVERSIFICATION DISCOUNT? 
Research from the past decades has diverged in whether diversified firms can create more value 
than focused, in favour of a more varied product segmentation and hence a spread in their risks. 
Consequently, it is not completely clear about the general effects of diversification on firm value, 
rather, the results are mixed and researchers have not yet managed to reach a consensus (Erdorf 
et al, 2013). It is thus more appropriate to consider in which situations a firm can gain from 
diversification, which is whenever there is a good match between the parent and the division (op 
cit). Prior research argues that firms with diversified product portfolios, for example have the 
opportunity to create an internal capital market in which the firm through internal resource 
allocation mechanism, more effectively may allocate capital generated within the firms product 
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portfolios to other parts of the firm (Staglianó et al, 2013). However, other papers suggest that 
cross-subsidization with internal power struggles and agency problems together with a less 
focused product segmentation outweigh the benefits from internal capital allocations. The 
seminal papers by Lang and Stulz (1994) and Berger and Ofek (1995), find significant 
diversification discounts in diversified firms. These papers measure the value of the firms 
through Tobin´s Q8, and through excess values9, respectively. In the latter case, the 
diversification discount amounted to an average of 13-15 percent during the period of 1986-
1991, i.e. diversified firms traded at 13-15 percent discount relative to single-segment peers. This 
value loss is however smaller when the segments of the diversified firms are in the same two-
digit SIC-codes10. The main reasons for this value loss identified by Berger and Ofek, are over-
investments by corporate managers, and cross-subsidization between the segments. 
Before going further on in the discussion about the diversification discount, the reader must 
beware. Even though that the majority of the diversification literature recognize that this discount 
is a reality, during the last years, some researchers have begun to question its existence (e.g. 
Hund, Monk and Tice, 2012; Maksimovic and Phillips, 2008). The main arguments are biases in 
the valuation methodology and the sample selection.       
2.2.1.1. DIVERSIFICATION AND STOCK RETURNS: LESS UPSIDE POTENTIAL 
One of the reasons for this diversification discount (the other one being relatively lower expected 
cash flows due to the above-mentioned reasons) is the lower so-called positive skewness in their 
stock returns.  
 
 
                                                
8 Defined as the market value of the firm (equity and debt) scaled by the replacement value of the firms assets (Erdorf et al, 
2013). 
9 Defined as the natural logarithm of the ratio of actual firm value (equity and debt) to the imputed firm value. This imputed firm 
value is the value when multiplying a reported accounting value (assets, sales or earnings) by the median ratio for single-segment 
firms in the same industry. Hence, it shows the firms value as if it would been a single-segment firm, and a discount or premium 
due to diversification is derived (ibid.). 
10 SIC codes stand for Standard Industrial Classification codes and were created in 1937 by U.S. government to build a system 
for categorization and classification of firm activities and their industry group. SIC codes include a 4-digit code, where the first 
classify a firms overall characteristics and thus its industrial group. The third and fourth digits of the code clarify a firms 
specialized areas and conduct a more detailed area levels (U.S Government, 2011). 
 14 
 
The skewness coefficient for 12 months of stock returns is as follows: 
𝑆 = 112 𝑟! − 𝜇 !!"!!!𝜎!  
EQUATION 1: SKEWNESS COEFFICIENT 
ri = monthly return of the stock 
µ = mean monthly return of the stock 
σ3= The cube of the estimated return standard deviation 
Mitton and Vorkink (2010), show that diversification discount firms have higher expected stock 
returns than their focused peers in order to compensate investors for offering less upside 
potential. Their research is an extension on Lamont and Polk (2001), and they find that this 
upside potential, referred to as positive skewness, is eroded with the grade of diversification, 
which means that stock returns of diversified firms have less variance and are less positively 
skewed than stock returns in focused firms. This can be thought of as a “bell-shaped” normal 
distribution curve where the right tail is longer, while most of the distribution is on the left side 
towards the left tail of the curve. Consequently, the impact is that investors require higher returns 
from diversified firms, in order to be compensated by the less likelihood of any extreme gains. In 
contrast, they propose that investors pay a premium for single-segment firms, due to higher 
upside potential (i.e. higher skewness coefficient). Their sample includes extreme winners; 
stocks with annual returns above 280 percent and the great majority of these are focused firms. 
Investors might otherwise choose to stay under-diversified in order to catch these extreme 
winners, however, in diversified firms this option is not provided since the whole firm is 
diversified.  
What are then the reasons for firms to diversify? Below are some of the most important motives 
from prior research.  
2.2.2. AGENCY THEORY AND POWER STRUGGLES 
Jensen (1986, 1993) argue that firms with large cash holdings will suffer from overinvestment 
problems, due to incentives for managerial discretion and misbehaviour in a way that gives rise 
to reduced shareholder maximization and value-destructive behaviour. Thus, managers have a 
tendency to grow their firms beyond the optimal size, for their own perquisites and private 
objectives. These private objectives include monetary compensation of different types, a 
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reduction in their employment risk through reduction in firm risk, and their entrenchment 
through manager-specific investments that make it costly to replace them (Jensen 1986; Amihud 
and Lev, 1981; Vishny and Shleifer, 1989). Scharfstein and Stein (2000) continue on Jensen’s 
hypothesis and argue that same behaviour can be seen in diversified firms where managers 
misallocate resources within a firms internal capital market. The implication is that managers 
acts in a destructive manner and invites to pareto inefficiency throughout the allocation chain. 
Scharfstein and Stein term the problem as cross-subsidization, or corporate socialism. They 
argue that divisional managers in diversified firms could increase their bargaining power on the 
basis of value maximization and where less profitable and weaker divisions might get subsidized 
with the help of more profitable and stronger divisions. This will also allow for negative 
expectations by the market and thus result in reduced value relative focused peers. 
Rajan, Servaes and Zingales (2000) continue on this track and argue that the best way for firms 
to maintain their internal capital allocation advantage compared to focused firm, is to dispose 
less profitable divisions and only keep those divisions that create value. However Rajan et al. 
show that this is unlikely and firms will instead introduce weaker behaviour and thus other 
agency problems connected to corporate socialism. Less profitable divisions get capital to fund 
investments since managers for these divisions are bribed so that they behave more 
cooperatively. This will essentially drag the remaining part of the firm down and hence 
encourage suboptimal capital allocations through the entire firm.  
Finally, using a sample of Italian11 firms from the period 1980-2006, Staglianó et al (2013) 
investigated why firms decide to diversify, more specifically, they compared the agency costs of 
free cash flow motive for diversification, with the internal markets motive. Based on their results 
they conclude that the strongest reason for firms to diversify is to gain benefits from internal 
markets.  
2.2.3. INTERNAL CAPITAL MARKETS AND “WINNER-PICKING” 
Gertner, Scharfstein and Stein (1994) find that the owner-provided internal capital has two 
important advantages over bank lending; increased monitoring, i.e. better flow of information 
                                                
11 The authors choice of Italian firms is motivated with the large number of elements of inefficiency in the allocation of funds 
among Italian firms. Such inefficiency can be seen in for example external capital markets, large controlling shareholders that 
exploit minority shareholders, problems with information asymmetries and in the corporate governance.  
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between users and providers of capital, and better asset redeployability, i.e. if one segment 
performs poorly its assets can be redeployed12 and combined with the other assets controlled by 
the corporate headquarters. However, a disadvantage is that the increased monitoring (and thus 
control) from the providers of internal capital, i.e. corporate headquarters, can diminish the 
segment managements incentives. The manager may feel that (s)he doesn't get all of the rents 
from their efforts, due to transfer of control to the providers of capital, i.e. to the corporate 
headquarters (or “parent company”). The first two (benefits) must outweigh the third (cost), in 
order for the internal capital markets to be beneficial for the diversified firm (op cit). 
Other studies with the subject of internal capital allocation and winner picking have also 
suggested that diversified firms during downturns develop a higher efficiency to survive. They 
show that firms can become more efficient in their internal capital market since they can be 
forced to focus even more on investment opportunities that actually generate the highest NPV 
(Rajan, Servaes and Zingales, 2000). This would thus result in less unprofitable projects and 
hence mitigate more severe agency problem. Koller et. al. (2010) on the other hand argue for the 
opposite; senior executives in diversified firms tend to respond to investment opportunities more 
slowly than executives in focused firms. 
For this specific thesis however, it is important to compare the value of internal capital markets 
during different market conditions. Yan, Yang and Jiao (2010) find that diversified firms have an 
advantage compared to focused single-segment firms in crisis periods when external capital 
markets become more costly, resulting in a decline of investments by focused firms. These 
results with increased value in diversified firms are consistent with Yan (2006) and Matsusaka 
and Nanda (2002), who further state that this increase is even greater for financially constrained 
conglomerates. Thus, a great advantage of diversification is the ability to substitute external 
capital markets with internal capital markets, which can be viewed as a real option. However, 
this advantage for diversified firms is not only due to the internal capital markets, but also due to 
the ease of access to external capital markets in economic downturns and financial crisis. This 
ease of access comes as a result from the so-called coinsurance effect, i.e. the reduced risk of 
default due to imperfectly correlated earnings in the different segments (Hann Ogneva and 
Ozbas, 2009). There is a decrease in systematic risk and hence the total cost of capital (op cit).    
                                                
12Also, one segments assets can be used as collateral for another segment (Erdorf et al, 2013).  
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2.2.4. DURING THE 2007-2009 FINANCIAL CRISIS 
Kuppuswamy et. al. claim that the value of diversification significantly increased during the 
2007-2009 Financial Crisis, due to financing and investment advantages over focused firms. 
They use the traditional excess value measure for discounts, i.e. the natural logarithm of a firm’s 
ratio between market value and its imputed market value (see footnote on p. 15). The discounted 
value relative their focused peers decreased with 7-9 percent during the crisis period. The main 
reason was the increasing costs for external capital, which made their internal capital markets 
more valuable, and also more efficient in regards to capital allocation; allocating funds to value-
increasing divisions. Also, diversified firms became significantly more leveraged than their 
focused peers during this period. More on leverage in diversified firms in the next section.  
Rudolph et. al. confirm that diversification discount of conglomerates fell significantly during 
the crisis years of 2008 and 2009. They study how the value of diversification was affected in 
different parts of the world, with regards to the institutional context, i.e. investor protection and 
development of capital markets. Hence, this value increase was higher in countries with strong 
investor protection and well-developed capital markets, e.g. the U.S. and the U.K. 
2.2.5. DEBT CO-INSURANCE 
Lewellen (1971) introduce the coinsurance effects theory13 and claimed that one can expect to 
see imperfect correlations in earnings streams, in more diversified firms, and thus greater debt 
capacity. This results in higher leverage and thus higher tax shield relative its focused peers. 
Higher leverage can also mitigate some of the potential agency problems through its disciplinary 
role of debt. Jaffe and Stiglitz (1990) proceeded with the coinsurance effects theory and argued 
that one could also expect higher credit ratings14 in diversified firms, which result in less costly 
external financing. 
Better access to external capital market for diversified firms even in a credit downturn, e.g. 
during the Financial Crisis, gives diversified firms better opportunities to substitute internal 
capital for external capital due to higher credit ratings and greater ability to carry more debt 
(Lewellen, 1971; Gertler and Gilchrist, 1994; Stein, 1997; Matsusaka and Nanda, 2002; Yan, 
                                                
13 Coinsurance effects refer to risk reduction of default for merged firms through imperfect correlation in earning stream and thus 
increase debt capacity of the new combining firm (Lewellen, 1971). 
14 Credit agencies like S&P and Moody´s use segmental and geographical diversifications as parameters when assessing a firm's 
credit rating (see for example www.moodys.com)  
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Yang and Jiao 2009). The same conclusion is made in Gertler and Gilchrist (1994), Kashyap, 
Lamont, Stein (1994), and Almeida and Campello (2007), which indicate that with reduced 
access to capital market, they also exhibit larger investments sensibility in credit market 
conditions. This suggests that firms with more limited opportunities to capitalize internal 
investments and simultaneously also have a limited ability to borrow on external markets, also 
may postpone investments or dropping them entirely during the credit downturns. 
Finally, an important study for this particular thesis is Duchin (2010), which finds that 
diversified firms hold significantly lower amounts of precautionary cash. This is due to reasons 
that cross-divisional diversification in investment opportunity is related to capital transfers across 
divisions, which drive firms to hold less cash when these transfers are abundant. The results are 
in line with the co-insurance effect and strongest in well-governed and financially constrained 
firms (ibid.). Since there are opportunity costs associated with large cash holdings, these results 
imply a positive gain in value for diversified firms (op. cit.).    
2.2.6. MARKET FRICTIONS 
Diversification because of market frictions, has been a widely used argument, i.e. transaction 
costs of internal financing is lower than external financing (e.g. bank loans).  In 1961, Gordon 
Donaldson introduced the theory of pecking order which Myers and Majluf (1984) later 
modified. They find that firms use the principle of minimal effort and minimal resistance to find 
the optimal source of funding, and this will result in a last resort for funding since firms will see 
an increase in equity as an expensive way to finance future projects. Instead, internal cash flows 
are the optimal funding source to maximize value-creation, since they will minimize adverse 
selection problems most firms suffer from. The arguments are in the information asymmetry 
within firms, where managers are assumed to have a more extensive and transparent information 
advantage regarding the firm’s future prospects, risks and value, in contrast to outside investors 
on the market. 
Donaldson (1961) and Myers and Majluf (1984) further find that information asymmetry will 
result in a price premium for external financing, which may give managers incentives to act in 
existing stockholders’ interest and thus pass up future valuable investment opportunities since 
they believe the firm is more undervalued than the NPV generated by the investment. Managers 
will thus issue the safest security, which also is seen to be the least sensitive to information 
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asymmetry problems. Beside equity and internal funds a firm can also choose to issue debt. Debt 
is seen to be in the middle between equity and internal funds in pecking order model (op cit). 
The reason for this lies in the difficulties to value the different securities, which furthermore 
implies investors information disadvantage as non-beneficial in terms of valuation possibilities. 
Debt on the other hand, is less difficult to value due to certain payoff streams compared to stocks 
and thus only have to rely on valuation of the collateral connected to the debt instead of the 
whole firm. 
2.3. THE HYPOTHESES 
Based on the literature review, it is possible to define the hypotheses for this study. These will 
form the forthcoming parts of this thesis, and help answer the research question.  
1. H0: There is no significant difference in abnormal stock returns between grade of 
diversified firms with no excess cash, and focused single-segment firms with excess cash, 
during the pre-crisis period.  
2. H0: There is no significant difference in abnormal stock returns between grade of 
diversified firms with no excess cash, and focused single-segment firms with excess cash, 
during the crisis period.  
3. H0: There is no significant difference in abnormal stock returns between grade of 
diversified firms with no excess cash, and focused single-segment firms with excess cash, 
during the post-crisis period.  
4. H0: There is no significant difference in abnormal stock returns between grade of 
diversified firms with no excess cash, and the 20 percent largest excess cash holding 
focused single-segment firms during the pre-crisis period.  
5. H0: There is no significant difference in abnormal stock returns between grade of 
diversified firms with no excess cash and the 20 percent largest excess cash holding 
focused single-segment firms during the crisis period.  
6. H0: There is no significant difference in abnormal stock returns between grade of 
diversified firms with no excess cash, and the 20 percent largest excess cash holding 
focused single-segment firms during the post-crisis period.  
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The hypotheses include a distinction between firms with different grade of diversification, i.e. 
firms with two, three or more business segments. This is done in order to reveal if the grade of 
diversification has an impact on the stock returns. This way, large international conglomerates 
will be part of the same sample. Also, there is a distinction between firms with simply excess 
cash holdings and firms with relatively large excess cash holdings, i.e. the top 20 percent of the 
firms with the most excess cash.  
2.4. EFFICIENT CAPITAL MARKETS – UNDERLYING ASSUMPTION    
As the research aims to fill the gap from prior research and provide evidence of differences in 
abnormal returns between diversified and focused firm with regards to excess cash holdings, 
evaluation of stock performances must be done by some measurement. But to be able to 
understand the fundamental theory behind these models, a guideline of the underlying arguments 
must first be discussed. 
2.4.1. EFFICIENT MARKET HYPOTHESIS 
According to financial theory, capital markets should be seen as efficient where arbitrage 
opportunities are not possible. The theory of efficient capital market is introduced by Fama 
(1970) and is today the leading theory and the fundamental assumption behind all market pricing 
and evaluation models. In efficient markets, all known information reflect market prices and 
thus, abnormal returns in excess of investors risk premium are thus not possible. Fama quoted: 
“The principal hypotheses following from quick and accurate reaction of price to new 
information is that stale information is of no value in money making” 
A conclusion which would prevent investors from using new information to generate excess 
returns, as merely unmediated information could be value creating and thus influence future 
price fluctuations. Fama termed the phenomenon as a random walk. Schleifer (2000) provide 
further discussions on Fama’s argument, and find that new information is priced in directly, 
which also mitigates arbitrage and mispricing of financial assets. To term market efficiency, 
Fama (1970) and Schleifer (2000) set for three grades of efficiency: 
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• The weakest form of efficiency: Trends from historical prices cannot be used to forecast 
future prices. 
• Semi-strong form of efficiency: All known information should be priced, and arbitrage by 
information interpretation and analysis is not possible. 
• Strongest form of efficiency: Latent information is assumed to be priced in, whereas 
insider trading is not possible. 
The implication would thus be that our model assumes efficient capital markets. But since this 
research doesn’t aim for ex-ante valuation but rather ex-post evaluation for differences between 
real return, the underlying efficiency assumption is not necessary for our purpose, but still 
important in order to understand evaluation of stocks and the pricing models used.   
2.4.2. TOTAL RETURNS TO STOCKHOLDERS (TSR) 
The total amount shareholders gain from their stocks is the percentage increase in stock price 
plus the dividend yield, commonly known as the Total Returns to Shareholder15, which often is 
used by investors as a measure of firm performance. However, Koller et. al. (2010) argue for a 
decomposition of TRS into four parts: 
• The value gained from revenue growth, net of the capital invested for the growth, which 
equals the improvements in operating performance (e.g. higher margins). 
• The earnings yield, i.e. the TRS in the beginning of the measurement period without any 
of the above mentioned growth. 
• Change in shareholders expectation for the firm’s performance, which can be measured 
with the help of P/E or P/B ratios for example. 
• The impact of financial leverage, i.e. debt financing of investments.  
Realized TRS thus depend on investor expectations on future performance. These expectations 
make TRS difficult to use as a performance measurement tool. Essentially, over short times 
periods such as three months, TRS measurements are also largely meaningless for intrinsic 
value, due to the domination of expectations over important factors for intrinsic value, such as 
revenue growth or return on invested capital (op.cit.). On short-term, TRS can simply be driven 
by movements in the industry or the broader market. For example, falling interest rates are 
                                                
15 Average annual TRS on U.S. equities for the last 200 years have been 6,5 percent adjusted for inflation (op. cit.). 
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known factors that have an effect on the stock markets. Also, irrational behaviour by investors 
can have its effect on the stock markets; ”whole markets can lose touch with fundamental laws 
grounded in economic growth and returns on investment” as Koller et. al. (2010) quoted it, 
referring to the Dot.com boom in the late nineties.  
Most recently, the economy was hit by the Global Financial Crisis, which wiped more than 50 
percent of the value of stock markets across the world, from their peak levels in 2007. For 
example, S&P 500 went from 1,565 in mid-2007, before dropping to 667 in March 2009 (op. 
cit). The large fluctuations on the market makes it therefore also interesting to compare focused 
firms with large excess cash holdings and diversified firms with less cash holdings, in order to 
discover any potential differences between the expectations on these firms. As a proxy for these 
expectations, the risk-adjusted excess returns of the stock prices are measured.  
2.4.3. MEASURING ABNORMAL RETURNS – JENSEN´S ALPHA  
The measure used in this research for the risk-adjusted stock returns, i.e. the abnormal returns 
over the so-called theoretical expected stock returns given the risk, is the commonly used 
Jensen´s Alpha. Jensen´s Alpha was first introduced back in 1968 as a performance measure for 
mutual funds, but can be applied to any asset (Jensen, 1986). The formula for Jensen´s Alpha is 
given by the intercept in the following equation:     
E[Ri] - Rf  = αi +  βi (E[Rm] - Rf ) 
When setting alpha as the dependent variable, a more common equation is introduced, which sets 
the way for the measurement of abnormal returns. The model can be seen below: 
αi = Ri – [Rf + βi (Rm – Rf )] 
EQUATION 2: JENSEN`S ALPHA 
Ri = Expected total return of the stock 
Rf = Risk-free interest rate (rf) 
Βi = Beta and systematic risk of the stock (βi) 
Rm = Expected market return (rm) 
As one can see from the formula above, the abnormal return is the return in excess of that given 
by a stocks theoretical return according to the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM). If a stock 
has a higher return than the risk-adjusted return, the stock is said to have a positive alpha, or an 
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abnormal return (op. cit.). Thus, the aim of this study is to compare the risk-adjusted stock 
returns in terms of alphas, for the sample of focused cash-rich and diversified firms. The risk-
free interest rate used in the model is usually a government bond, e.g. U.S. treasury bond for U.S. 
stocks or a German Eurobond for European stocks (Koller et. al., 2010). But since this research 
doesn’t aim to distinguish the differences between market return and stock return, but rather 
between two different strategies, both risk-free interest rate and market return/premium is of less 
importance. However, due to the transparency motives, both variables will be discussed and 
implemented in their entirety.  
The beta of a stock represents the systematic risk, in terms of the correlation between the stock's 
volatility and the “markets” volatility. The market in this case is a hypothetical portfolio of all 
the weighted assets and securities across the entire world (Byström, 2007). For example, a stock 
with a beta of 1 will have the exact same theoretical volatility as the market; if the market 
increases one percent, the stock increases one percent as well (Byström, 2007). A beta of 2 
means that a stock is twice as volatile as the market (ibid.) which also means that a stock with 
beta 2 will increase or decrease twice as much as the market portfolio. In reality however, the 
market portfolio is a well-diversified portfolio of stocks, e.g. Standard & Poors 500 (S&P500) or 
Morgan Stanley Capital International (MSCI) World Index (Koller et. al. 2010).  
Other models can be used for the same purpose, but in order to motivate the choice of Jensens 
Alpha, this next section provides two alternative methods together with some theoretical issues 
connected to them.   
2.4.4. ALTERNATIVE MODELS 
2.4.4.1. SHARPE RATIO 
For the last 50 years, the Sharpe ratio has been a widely used and well-known evaluation tool to 
evaluate stock returns and mutual funds. Sharpe (1966) introduced the ratio, which first was 
named “reward-to-variability” for its characteristics of evaluation risk returns but was later 
renamed after its author. The model is similar to the so-called Information ratio16, and it can be 
interpreted as the risk-adjusted return ratio of a zero investment strategy. The measurement 
characteristics are assigned to measure expected return per unit of risk in volatility. The model is 
                                                
16The equation for information ratio can be seen as Rit - Rft  = αi +  βi (Rmt - Rft ) + eit, , where the ratio then is defined as IRi = 
ai/Std ei 
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further based on ex ante values but is more commonly used and implemented as ex post 
evaluation. Sharp (1966, 1994) define the model as: 
𝑆𝑟! = 𝐸 𝑅! − 𝑅!𝜎!  
EQUATION 3: SHARPE RATIO 
Ri = Expected total return of the stock 
Rf = Risk-free interest rate (rf) 
σi = Volatility for the stock 
The model is especially beneficial due to its ability to test for differences between risk-adjusted 
portfolios as:  
H0: Srij ≡ Sri – Srj = 0. 
The model assumes returns to be independent and identically distributed (IID) and thus serially 
uncorrelated, which essentially means that transformed differences of the statistics as normal 
distributed with mean Srij and variance θ (Jobson and Korkie, 1981). The reason why the Sharpe 
ratio became a global measurement tool is due to the interest of risk-adjusted returns assigned to 
rational investors, who have a desire to achieve the highest return per unit of risk as possible. 
Obviously the model provides incentives to investors and justifies evaluating regarding risk-
adjusted returns across portfolios or assets. Nevertheless, the model contains volatility (σ), which 
measures the whole risk and thus not only systematic or idiosyncratic risk. At first sight, the 
model would therefore also be beneficial for this research purpose. 
However, Sharpe has some major destructive drawbacks, especially during uncertain and 
problematic states of the economy where the model generates misleading conclusions. Israelsen 
(2003) named the problem as “The negative excess return dilemma”. To demonstrate the 
behaviour, consider two portfolios. Portfolio A generates returns of -3 percent and a stock 
volatility of 3 percent, while portfolio B generates returns of -30 percent and a volatility of 40 
percent. Obviously portfolio B is worse off than portfolio A, both in risk and returns. However, 
Sharpe ratio will prefer portfolio B over A since the ratio indicate -1 for portfolio A and -0,75 for 
portfolio B, which means that inferior portfolios are preferred over more attractive ones. Since 
our research also focuses on downturns in the economy, Sharpe ratio is to consider as 
inappropriate due to its major drawbacks during unstable market conditions, a conclusion which 
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also is consistent with Sholtz & Wilkens (2005). Due to these drawbacks, the use of Sharpe Ratio 
is not of interest or relevance for this study and this gives a better understanding for the choice of 
Jensen´s Alpha.   
2.4.4.2. TREYNORS RATIO 
Just as Sharpe ratio, the Treynor ratio measures excess return per unit of risk, but unlike the 
Sharpe ratio, Treynor only focuses on the systematic risk and therefore not the overall risk, 
which also introduce the assumptions of non-diversifiable risk associated with the asset. This 
assumption is obviously fundamental for the use of the model and makes it directly unsuitable as 
a risk measure in less diversified portfolios. Treynor (1973) defines the model as; 
𝑇𝑟! = 𝑅! − 𝑅!𝛽!  
EQUATION 4: TREYNORS RATIO 
Ri = Expected total return of the stock 
Rf = Risk-free interest rate (rf) 
βi = Beta and systematic risk for the stock 
To look at potential drawback beside previously mentioned assumptions, one should turn the 
attention to the dimensionality of the model, where it only ranks the outcome rather than quantify 
the added value. Ranking will subsequently only be considered as appropriate if the sample 
portfolios are considered as fully diversified, which more or less makes the model useless for 
regular investors. If this assumption isn´t satisfied, portfolios with different idiosyncratic risks 
are ranked equally, ceteris paribus, which will give rise to either distortion in mispricing of the 
assets if evaluations are being used ex ante. Alternatively, incorrect inference regarding a 
portfolio's risk-adjusted return in ex post evaluations. Treynor ratio can thereafter be rearranged 
and traceable to the more common CAPM, which should give rise to the question if the model 
also should be seen as equivalent to Jensen's Alpha? The answer is no, since the differences 
between the models introduce potential errors in the comparative rankings (Jobson and Korkie, 
1981). The conclusion is that neither Sharpe nor Treynor can be considered as appropriate for the 
purpose of this research. And even if Jensen's Alpha can be criticized with CAPM arguments of 
inefficient markets and pricing errors, it nevertheless gives quantification potential for excess 
returns and does not invite to misleading conclusion regarding defective rankings.  
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3. METHOD 
 
In this chapter, a thorough presentation of the method is given, which includes details of the data used, 
the models for deriving excess cash and abnormal stock returns, and the definition of diversified firms. 
Both practical and theoretical aspects are explained and motivated, with the goal of having a full 
transparency and a total replicability.  
 
3.1. OVERVIEW OF METHOD STRATEGY 
The choice of method has to a large extent been inspired by prior research, e.g. Opler et. al 
(1999) for determining excess cash.17 The study is based on a quantitative deductive approach, 
i.e. with the development of hypotheses from prior research and theory, which are tested with 
statistical analyses (Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill, 2009).  
In order to give the reader a clear view of the practical process of the method, the following 
intermediate section will provide a short overview of the different steps involved in the method. 
This is then followed up by a more detailed presentation of the work behind. 
1. The first step involves the collection of relevant cross-section data for measuring firms 
excess cash and grade of diversification (e.g. Cash and Short Term Investments, Total 
Assets, SIC-codes, et cetera). This is done for all listed U.S. firms available in Thomson 
Reuters DataStream® and results in a spreadsheet with approximately 14,000 U.S. firms / 
year of different size and in different industries. However, the firm sample decreases 
substantially after the first elimination round. In line with prior research, the sampling 
criteria exclude firms in the financial and utility sector, firms without all necessary data 
available, and finally, all firms with below 20 million dollars in annual sales. 
2. In step two, firms are sorted out by their SIC-codes and sale per segment, which leads to 
a distinction between diversified and focused firms. At first sight it seems as a wearisome 
task, but proves to be a fairly smooth process due to the IF(AND) functions in Excel. 
3. The third step involves processing of the downloaded data since some of the variables for 
the determination of excess cash are not available as “ready to use” variables in the 
database, and thus need to be derived with the help of available variables. For example, 
                                                
17 Excess cash are all the liquid funds in the firm regarded as unneeded for the daily operations. 
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average industry cash flow volatility is estimated with regards to EBIT, Interest 
Payments, Tax Payments, Depreciation and Total Assets.      
4. In step four, regressions for excess cash are run in Eviews®, which through the residuals 
reveal which firms hold excess cash. Hence, they can now be sorted out in different 
dimensional portfolios by the relative amount of cash. This is done for both diversified 
and focused firms. Also, diversified firms, which are considered as highly diversified 
according to their SIC-codes and sales per segment, are distinguished and put in separate 
portfolios, hence; a grade of diversification is created.   
5. In the fifth step, firms´ stock returns, and market index returns (for beta estimation) are 
downloaded from the same database as earlier. Also, the risk free interest rate with a 
relevant maturity is downloaded, whereas a market risk premium is determined with help 
of the literature. 
6. The final step involves measuring abnormal stock returns in the different portfolios with 
the help of the equation for Jensen´s Alpha. These returns are then tested in Eviews® for 
significant differences between the portfolios.  
3.2. DATA AND SAMPLE 
In order to receive the cross-section data for the firms´ excess cash holdings, segmental 
diversification and their stock returns, data from Thomson Reuters DataStream®18 is used. The 
total number of U.S. firms that end up in the final sample after the sorting process, are on 
average 826 focused and 358 diversified firms per year. The proportion of diversified firms to 
focused firms is quite similar to prior studies, 25-40 % (e.g. Yan et. al. 2010). The data covers a 
total of 10 years, 2004 – 2013. The study is limited to non-financial and non-utility firms 19 with 
a minimum of $20 millions in annual sales. The exclusion of firms in the financial- and utility 
industry is a common practice in prior research on cash holding, due to these firms´ regulatory 
requirements on capital and “cash” in the form of current marketable securities (Opler et. al., 
                                                
18 Prior empirical studies in diversification have mainly used Compustat as a source. However, some papers criticize the use of 
Compustat due to claims of misclassifications in segmental data, for example that the true extent of diversification is higher than 
reported in Compustat (e.g. Lichtenberg, 1991; Villalonga, 2004). Thus, besides for practical reasons, this is another argument for 
the use of a different database.   
19 Financials have SIC-codes between 6000-6999, whereas utilities have SIC-codes between 4900-4999. Note however, that 
industrial firms with a financial segment are not excluded, since these firms are often large conglomerates that have initially had 
their prime industrial segment, but later expanded to the financial industry. A good example is General Electrics, which started of 
as an electrical distribution company, but nowadays are present in the business and consumer finance industry as well (GE 
Money and GE Commercial Finance, respectively).  
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1999). The exclusion of firms with less than $20 millions in sales is made for reasons of not 
getting too small single-segment firms in the sample, which may give rise to bias and distorting 
results since conglomerates usually are relatively large (e.g. Berger and Ofek 1995; Rudolph et. 
al., 2013).  
3.2.1. TIME INTERVAL OF STUDY 
Boldin and Cici (2010) argue that the majority of prior research within areas based on financial 
statistics has based their frequency data on time interval of 5-10 years in order to get a decent 
consistency and relevance in their time selection. This time length is also assumed to be 
appropriate for this research purpose, in order to maintain a relevance and reliability throughout 
the research. One should also understand the interests behind the research, where a benchmark 
period against credit downturns is highly necessary to distinguish any disparities between 
diversification and focused firms with regards of cash holdings during different states of the 
economy. One might therefore also assume that there can be different results between different 
time periods and this makes it even more relevant for a wider time frame of 10 years. With 
regards to these assumptions the choice of time interval is set at 10 years.  
To specify the exact time period we turn the attention to the Financial Crisis, which had its 
origins in the household sector, more specifically, in the wave of subprime mortgage defaults in 
early 2007 (Gorton, 2008). Later that year, mortgage defaults also began to slowly spill over to 
the supply of bank credits, which affected the corporate sector (Ivashina and Scharfstein, 2010). 
The bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers on 15th of September 2008 was the starting point for the 
huge drop in stock performances across equity markets throughout the world. Also, bank lending 
in the form of new loans for large borrowers in the U.S. fell by 47 percent during this period in 
2008 (ibid.). Kuppuswamy et. al. (2010) define the crisis period with the following three periods: 
• Early crisis: Q3 2007 - Q3 2008   
• Late crisis: Q4 2008 - Q1 2009  
• Post crisis: Q2 2009 - Q4 2009  
As this study aims to look at differences between focused firms and diversified firms during 
different states in the economy, a time frame including 2007 - 2008 is of greatest interest, 
specifically between January 2004 - December 2013, which gives the opportunity to catch the 
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differences before, during and after the crisis, where the crisis as a whole will be defined as Q3 
2007 - Q1 2009. The rest is defined as pre-crisis and post-crisis period. The crisis can be seen 
graphically by plotting out the intensity of it measured by two of the same variables as in 
Kuppuswamy et. al. (2010)20 :   
• The so-called TED-spread, which is the difference between a 3-month LIBOR and the 
yield on a 3-month treasury bills, is an indication of the liquidity in the financial system.  
• The Chicago Board Options Exchange Volatility Index (VIX), shows the implied 
volatility of the S&P 500 options index, and is often referred to as the “fear index”, since 
it indicates the market's future expectations of the stock market volatility for the coming 
30-day period (Bloomberg, 2014). 
 
Figures 1 and 2 illustrate the TED-spread and VIX respectively. The TED-spread is shown in 
basis points (1 percent = 100 bps) and the VIX is shown in annualized percentage change. 
Hence, the values in the figure for the VIX are divided by √12 to get the VIX on a monthly basis. 
 
 
FIGURE 1: THE SPREAD BETWEEN A 3-MONTH LIBOR, I.E. THE INTERBANK INTEREST RATE, AND THE YIELD ON A 
3-MONTH TREASURY BILL. 
 
                                                
20 Kuppuswamy et. al. (2010) also use the difference between 3-month commercial papers over treasury bills of the same 
maturity, for the pre-crisis period. However, they point out that, according to Almeida et. al. (2009), this measure is highly 
correlated with the TED-spread, especially from Q4 2008 and beyond.  
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FIGURE 2: MARKETS IMPLIED VOLATILITY (%) ON THE S&P500 OPTIONS INDEX. THE VALUES IN THE FIGURE ARE 
DIVIDED BY √12 IN ORDER TO GET THE VIX ON A MONTHLY BASIS. 
Since this study aims at highlighting the difference between diversified firms and cash-rich 
focused firms during credit downturns, there is a chance to capture both market behaviour in 
terms of return and risk-adjusted returns before the downturn, and its behaviour during and after 
the downturn. One can therefore assume that the breakpoints will provide a good base to 
illustrate the differences that may arise between the two firm characteristics.  
3.3. DEFINITION OF CASH-RICH FOCUSED FIRMS  
Cash-rich focused firms are defined as focused firms with significant amounts of excess cash on 
their balance sheets, at the end of every year. For firms to be classified as focused, it is required 
of them to have reported only one segment and thus have one SIC-code in DataStream. In the 
case where a firm has more than one segment, requirements are set to show the same three-digit 
SIC-codes, i.e. the first three figures in their SIC must be the same. This requirement has also 
been used in prior research (Subramaniam et. al., 2010).  
To determine and define excess cash, prior research has used a set of variables by the same way 
as Opler, Pinkowitz, Stulz and Williamson (1999). However since prior research also provide 
arguments for larger excess holdings in focused firms compared to diversified (e.g. Duchin, 
2010), the model is modified with a dummy variable and therefore improved to better determine 
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excess cash variation between firms. Diversification as determinant of excess cash is actually 
tested in Opler et. al. (1999) as well, but the variable turns out to be insignificant for the sample 
as whole21. The model with this slight modifications: 
𝐶!" = 𝛽!!𝑀𝐵!" + 𝛽!!𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒!" + 𝛽!!𝐶𝐴𝑃𝐸𝑋!" + 𝛽!!𝑁𝑊𝐶!" + 𝛽!!𝐿!" + 𝛽!!𝐹𝐷𝐶!" + 𝛽!!𝐶𝐹!" + 𝛽!!𝜎!"!"#$%&'( + 𝛽!!𝐷𝐼𝑉!" + 𝛽!"!𝑆𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑔𝑦!" + 𝜀!" 
 
EQUATION 5: MODEL FOR DEFINING EXCESS CASH 
The original model is one of the most widely used in the literature of corporate excess cash 
holdings (e.g. Bates et. al., 2009; Subramaniam et. al., 2010). The model shows how different 
variables determine a firm's excess cash holdings. In the model, epsilon represents the residuals 
in the regression. Whenever positive, these residuals indicate that a firm has excess cash 
holdings. The betas are the coefficients for the different variables that Opler et. al. (1999) 
identify as determinants of corporate cash holdings. The model has been extended with a dummy 
variable – called strategy, which takes the value of one if the firm is focused, and zero otherwise. 
The dependant variable (Cit) is thus a firms all liquid asset holdings at time t.  
3.3.1. DEPENDANT VARIABLE 
Liquid Asset Holdings (Cit ): To derive liquid asset holding, Opler et. at. (1999) use the natural 
logarithm of Cash and Short Term Investments divided with Total Book Value of Assets less 
Cash and Short Term Investments. The denominator is referred to as “net assets”. 
 𝐶!" = 𝐿𝑁 𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ  𝑎𝑛𝑑  𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡  𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑚  𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙  𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘  𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒  𝑜𝑓  𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 − 𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ  𝑎𝑛𝑑  𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡  𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑚  𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠  
 
3.3.2. INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
Market-to-book (MB): Opler et. al. (1999) defines the market-to-book ratio as book value of 
assets minus book value of equity, plus market value of equity. This term is then divided with 
total book value of assets less cash and short-term investments, i.e. net assets. Market-to-book 
measures the market's expectations about the firms future NPV investment opportunities and the 
likelihood of these opportunities being positive. Since book values of assets doesn´t include 
future growth options, the market's expectations are thus taken into consideration with the 
                                                
21 The variable “number of segments” is significant at the 10 % level for only a subsample of firms using derivatives as hedging 
instruments.  
 32 
 
market value of equity. Firms that have high market values relative their book values are 
believed to have high future growth opportunities (ibid.). 
𝑀𝐵!" = 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙  𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘  𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒  𝑜𝑓  𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 − 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙  𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘  𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒  𝑜𝑓  𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦 +𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡  𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒  𝑜𝑓  𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙  𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘  𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒  𝑜𝑓  𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 − 𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ  𝑎𝑛𝑑  𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡  𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑚  𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠  
 
Firm size (SIZE): The size of a firm is according to Opler et. al. (1999) an important determinant 
of its cash holdings. The variable is defined as the natural logarithm of total book value of assets 
at the end of each year.    
𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒!" = 𝐿𝑁(𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙  𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘  𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒  𝑜𝑓  𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠!"#$  !"#) 
Capital Expenditure (CAPEX): Capital expenditures are all the investments in various fixed 
assets made by a firm (e.g. property, plant and equipment), investments in assets that are 
believed to bring future benefits for the firm. These are then divided by net assets to get CAPEX 
in proportion to firm size.    
𝐶𝐴𝑃𝐸𝑋!" = 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙  𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙  𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘  𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒  𝑜𝑓  𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 − 𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ  𝑎𝑛𝑑  𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡  𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑚  𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠 
Net Working Capital (NWC): To measure liquid asset substitutes, Opler et. al. (1999) uses 
working capital less cash and short-term investments, divided by net assets. The ratio shows the 
liquid assets excluding cash that a firm can sell off as non-core assets during periods of economic 
distress (Lang et al, 1994).  
𝑁𝑊𝐶!" = 𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑘𝑖𝑛𝑔  𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 − 𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ  𝑎𝑛𝑑  𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡  𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑚  𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙  𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘  𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒  𝑜𝑓  𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 − 𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ  𝑎𝑛𝑑  𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡  𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑚  𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠 
 
Leverage (L): Leverage is also a determinant of excess cash holdings, and it is measured with the 
plain debt-to-asset ratio.  
𝐿!" =   𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡  𝑇𝑒𝑟𝑚  𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡 + 𝐿𝑜𝑛𝑔  𝑇𝑒𝑟𝑚  𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙  𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘  𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒  𝑜𝑓  𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠  
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Financial Distress Cost (FDC): As a proxy for potential financial distress costs, the R&D 
expense-to-sale ratio is used. A large number of firms do not report any R&D expenses however, 
these are then considered to be firms with no such expenses, all in line with Opler et. al. (1999).   
𝐹𝐶𝐷!" = 𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑐ℎ  &  𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙𝑜𝑝𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒  
 
Cash Flows (CF): Measured as EBIT less interest, taxes and dividends paid out, but before 
depreciation. This is then divided by net assets, again as defined above. When dividing with net 
assets, one gets the cash flows relative to the size of a firm.  
𝐶𝐹!" =   𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇 + 𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 − 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 − 𝑇𝑎𝑥𝑒𝑠 − 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑛  𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑠𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙  𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘  𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒  𝑜𝑓  𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠  
Industry Cash Flow Volatility (σindustry): The cash flows are also used for calculation of the 
industry cash flow volatilities. The volatility, which equals the average standard deviation of the 
industry´s cash flows, is the measure for cash flow riskiness in a specific industry (industry 
defined by two-digit SIC). The cash flows for each firm in the 10-year period22 preceding this 
study´s time interval (i.e. 1993-2003) are downloaded, whereby the standard deviation for each is 
calculated. The firms are then grouped in their respective industry, and average volatility across 
all firms in an industry are thereby obtained.  
Firm strategy (Strategy): A dummy is included to explain the difference between diversified and 
focused firms. If the firm is focused, the dummy takes on the value of one, otherwise zero. 
Dividend Payment (DIV): Finally, the regression also contains a second dummy variable that 
takes into account for dividend payouts, i.e. if a firm pays out any dividends the variable takes on 
the value of one, otherwise zero. 
3.4. DEFINITION OF DIVERSIFIED FIRMS  
The definition of diversified firms is on the other hand somewhat unclear and can sometimes 
seem arbitrary. Since 1997, FASB has implemented a standard, referred to as SFAS No. 131, for 
                                                
22 Opler et al (1999) actually makes the calculation for a 20-year time period, but due to time limitations for data processing 
(downloading and sorting out), we settled with 10 years. Also, there was a lot of relevant data missing for firms in DataStream, 
for years prior 1992. 10 years is also used by Simutin (2010).   
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the way public firms in the U.S. are required to report greater segment disclosure about the 
segments in which they operate (Yan, 2006). This standard basically requires a firm to report 
financial and descriptive information about its operating segments, if the firm has separate 
internal financial information available for the segment in order for the management to keep 
track on and evaluate the performance. The standard requires information for segment profits and 
losses, specific revenue and expense items, and specific segment assets (FASB, 2014).  
There is however differences in the literature on the definition of diversified firms. Mitton and 
Vorkink, (2010) in their study of the diversification-discount, define diversified firms as those 
that have more than one four-digit SIC-code reported in Compustat. Yan (2006) define 
diversified and even conglomerates in a similar way, while Tong (2011) also follows this 
reasoning but states that she gets similar results by defining diversified firms as firms that have at 
least two segments with different two-digit SIC-codes. Han-Shin et. al. (1998), Subramaniam et. 
al. (2011), and Hann et. al. (2009) define a firm as diversified in this way, i.e. if it reports more 
than one business segment at the different two-digit level. The literature refers to these segments 
as unrelated, since the first two digits indicate the major industry group of the segment (Erdorf 
et. al. 2013).   
This thesis goes with this way of defining diversification as well, mainly for two reasons. First, 
remember that prior research argues that both the value of internal capital markets and excess 
cash holding increases during periods of crisis. Since the aim of the study is to find out whether 
diversified firms provide higher abnormal returns than focused cash-rich firms, it feels intuitive 
to set a clear distinction between the two firm characteristics. A lot of firms in the sample have 
indeed reported more than one different SIC-code, but when looking at the three-digit level, 
these firms´ segments can be quite related with each other. For example, Wasau Paper 
Corporation is a firm in the sample, with the SIC-codes 2621 and 267623. This firm produces 
towel and tissue products, such as; roll towel, folded towels, facial tissue, and household roll 
towels (Wasau Paper Corporation, 2014). They also have roll towel dispensers, bath tissue 
dispensers, dairy towels, hand care products (soap) and hand care dispensers (ibid.). However, it 
is hard to justify this firm as (enough) diversified, and that it has an internal capital market which 
enables it to sell of non-core assets in the case of a lower demand, or moving capital from one 
                                                
23 Paper Mills and Sanitary Paper Products respectively  
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segment to another. On the other hand, if one defines diversification at the two-digit level, there 
is an inclusion of firms with unrelated segments such as Newtek Business Services. This firm 
provides its customers with small business loans, merchant processing (i.e. different payment 
solutions), and even web services (Newtek.com, 2014).  
The second reason for this choice of definition is due to the prior literature, which finds stronger 
effects for unrelated diversification and capital markets. For example, Staglianó et. al. (2013) 
state that related and unrelated diversification have different drivers; unrelated diversification 
outside a firms core-business is mostly associated with benefits from internal capital markets 
which are extracted when external financial capital markets fail, while related diversification is 
more driven by factors regarding product expansion and technology. Thus, there is a specific 
benefit for unrelated diversification and internal capital markets, which outweighs the costs from 
opportunistic problems and agency costs. Also, the above-mentioned findings from 
Kuppuswamy et. al. (2010), on the reduction in diversification discounts during the Financial 
Crisis, is entirely attributable to unrelated form of diversification. 
To mitigate potential bias in classification, and in accordance with prior research, firms that 
report more than 90 percent of their revenues in only one segment are regarded as focused 
(Rudolph, 2013). The research also aims to reclassify firms every year, which will result in 
changes in data structure since firms goes from focused to diversified and vice versa during this 
time period (“refocusing” or “diversifying”).  
3.5. PORTFOLIOS 
For every year, focused firms with positive residuals and therefore excess cash are put together 
in portfolios and compared with diversified firms without any excess cash, i.e. diversified firms 
with negative residuals. Thus, we avoid firms that are both cash-rich and diversified. Also, 
subsequent tests are made where the top 20th percent of all focused firms that hold the most 
excess cash are put in one separate portfolio and again compared with diversified firms that don´t 
hold any excess cash. Simutin (2010) in his study on stock returns in firms that hold excess cash 
divides the portfolios in deciles. However, in this case, it will result in quite a few firms in every 
portfolio.  
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FIGURE 3: THE PORTFOLIO STRUCTURE AND HENCE THE GRADE OF DIVERSIFICATION AND EXCESS CASH 
POSITION FOR DIVERSIFIED AND FOCUSED FIRMS RESPECTIVELY. 
 
Also, it is tested whether grade of diversification can play an important part. The diversified 
portfolio is split in three grades of diversification: 
• Low grade of diversification, which consists of firms that operate in two different 
segments.  
• Medium grade of diversification, which consists of firms that operate in three different 
segments.    
• High grade of diversification, which are firms that operate in many different segments, 
and are often referred to as holdings.  
3.6. INPUTS USED FOR JENSEN´S ALPHA  
As mentioned in the prior chapter, abnormal returns are measured with the help of Jensen´s 
Alpha. In this section, different inputs will be presented and motivated. Again, the equation is:  
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αi = Ri – [Rf + βi (Rm – Rf )] 
 
EQUATION 6: JENSEN´S ALPHA 
Ri = Expected total return of the stock 
Rf = Risk-free interest rate (rf) 
Βi = Beta and systematic risk of the stock (βi) 
Rm = Expected market return (rm) 
 
The risk-free interest rate used in the formula for abnormal returns is a simple U.S. treasury bond 
with a relevant maturity, in this case 1 year. The interest rate is downloaded from DataStream.  
When it comes to the betas of the stocks, they are calculated with the same methodology as in 
Koller et. al. (2010). The steps involved for gaining as accurate betas as possible, are the 
following. First, regressing the raw betas against a well-diversified market index, i.e. using the 
SLOPE function in Excel on the logarithmic returns24 of the stocks against the logarithmic 
returns of S&P500. The frequency is monthly, and for a 5-year period preceding the studied 
period, i.e. the betas for 2004 are calculated with monthly stock returns for 1999-2003. This 
results in 60 observations for each stock, all in line with Koller et. al. (2010). These betas are the 
so-called raw levered betas. They argue that daily or weekly returns leads to systematic biases, 
due to the fact that some stocks are rather illiquid and will show zero returns for daily or weekly 
frequencies. The consequence from this is that betas of illiquid stocks will be biased downward. 
One also have to see the other side of beta estimation, where market betas are unknown and 
therefore estimated with historical stock return. Beta estimation will thus be backward looking 
rather than forward and cause potential two pass methodology problem in afterward regressions. 
A commonly used method to reduce this bias is to increase the length of the time period for beta 
estimation. However, when this is done, the assumption of stationarity in beta also exists, which 
is not the case. A total of 60 observations therefore seem reasonable.  
Other problems might also be referred to a distortion from the so-called bid-ask bounce that 
depends on the last trade in a specific day or week and thus creates spurious volatility and non-
positive autocorrelation which has nothing to do with the intrinsic value of the stock (Roll, 
1984). Thus, the closing price depends on whether the last trade was a purchase or a sale. The 
                                                
24 Closing prices 
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bid-ask bounce is however reduced by using long-period returns, such as weekly returns (Koller 
et al, 2010).  
The levered beta is then stripped out of its leverage, to get ”operating” beta (ibid.). This is done 
with the equation βU = βL / (1 + D/E) where the D/E ratio is Long-Term Debt + Short Term Debt 
divided by Market Value of Equity. This unlevered beta is the taken across an entire industry, 
with the help of primary SIC 1 codes. An entire industry´s median is then calculated. The usage 
of SIC 1 ensures that highly diversified conglomerates are sorted into their primary industry for 
the median calculation. Finally, the beta of each firm is re-levered with the firms D/E ratio,  
βL = βU, IND MEDIAN  × (1 + D/E) to get the firm-specific levered beta.  
The results from this procedure are rather similar to the ready to use betas that are provided by 
DataStream. However, admittedly, there are some discrepancies. Possible reasons for this are the 
fact that DataStream uses Bayesian Adjustments25 on the raw betas (according to a phone 
conversation with their customer service). Also, it is unclear how narrow they classify the 
industries when deriving the industry median betas.   
Finally, we have the Market Risk Premium (MRP), which is the difference between the market's 
expected return and the risk-free interest rate. According to Koller et. al. (2010), the MRP can be 
estimated through different methods, e.g. through regression analysis or through measuring and 
extrapolating historical returns. However, the purpose of this thesis is not to delve into the 
estimation of the MRP, instead, a constant MRP of 5.4 percent is assumed. Koller et al (2010) 
states that this figure is a fair estimation for the time period of May 2009. They believe that the 
MRP has continually varied between 4.5 percent and 5.5 percent throughout the last century, and 
that the MRP has only experienced a marginal increase due to the Financial Crisis (op. cit.).   
3.7. SECONDARY DATA AND ITS CRITICS 
Secondary data is collected by a second party or more obvious, sources whose data are obtained 
through primary data. Secondary data can thus be secondary in several steps and therefore much 
more uncertain regarding reliability and correctness. One should therefore also be aware of the 
underlying danger secondary data can bring, since it not only is built on primary sources but also 
                                                
25 Bayesian adjustment is a statistical method used for improving uncertain variables. The process includes pushing outliers 
towards the mean, in order to mitigate over- and underestimations (Lindley, 1972)     
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tertiary26. One may therefore assume some probability of incorrect information when information 
passed different levels of information retrieval and thus incorrect somewhere along the way 
(Saunders, Lewis & Thornhill, 2009). Thus, the researcher should always validate this kind of 
data in order to check its accuracy. Saunders, Lewis & Thornhill (2009) suggest that a possible 
explanation to researchers use of secondary sources instead of primary is due to its ease of 
access, which results in a lower quality and thus a lower reliability in their dataset compared to 
researchers who only use primary sources. To counteract negative influences in this research, 
generated by inaccurate information regarding tertiary sources, only reputable sources have been 
used in the most possible extent and they have been validated against other sources as much as 
possible. 
3.8. VALIDITY AND RELIABILITY 
This research aims to find potential discrepancies in abnormal returns between firms with 
different industry compositions. The progress of classification regarding both excess cash and 
industry segmentations width must therefore be of highly importance to ensure the validity of the 
selection process and thus, a fair measure of divergence in abnormal returns between the two 
strategies. However, some non-existence might be present in the sense of SIC code 
misallocation, due to the risk that SIC codes rarely give a complete description of a firm's 
product or industry range, but rather an illustration of the manufacturing chain throughout the 
whole corporation. Incorrect segment classification might therefore occur in the sample and thus 
generate bias in alpha estimation for the strategies if no control mechanisms exist. 
However, to reduce matching problematization regarding product and industry segmentation 
compositions and thus potential biases in the alpha regression, 5 percent of each category sample 
has randomly been selected to validate segmentation composition between firms. To utilize these 
benchmark assessments, SIC-codes have been compared to segmentation charts from Yahoo 
Finance, where the outcome indicates a high correlation between SIC codes and segmentation 
chart classification. This makes the categorization trustworthy. The comparison indicates a high 
matching degree for firms where segmentation charts was available. The classification methods 
regarding product and industry segmentation are therefore assumed to be fairly pleased. To 
                                                
26 Tertiary sources can be seen as secondary sources in which data is build on other secondary data.  
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further on reduce bias in strategy change between years, reclassification of all firms has also 
been utilized during all years in the studied period.  
The study thus demonstrates a correct and current product segmentation compositions and excess 
cash holdings during all years and therefore guarantees a high validity throughout the estimation 
chain for the research. One should also consider the validity check of the accounting data 
underlying the excess cash estimations, where even this verification have been done by random 
selection and validated against annual reports during all years of the research. Even here the 
study can demonstrate a high degree of reliability regarding the choice of data collection from 
DataStream. To address the potential measurement error and bias in frequency data related to 
stock prices from DataStream, random selection from Yahoo Finance has been done to validate 
correctness throughout the estimation window. 
As the research follows prior research methodology and include historical frequency-based data 
to demonstrate discrepancies between product and industry compositions, comparable result can 
be replicable for future researchers. Thus, it is provided a high degree of reliability to the extent 
of firm and variables selection based on identical choice of working methodology, time period 
and similar adequate selections. All variables, downloaded from DataStream are given in 
appendix A, together with their codes.  
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4. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
 
In this fourth chapter, the results from the study are presented and described. Starting off with the results 
from the excess cash regression, complemented with some diagnostic tests, and then moving on to the 
results from the abnormal return measurements, this chapter tests the hypotheses formed in chapter two.  
  
4.1. EXCESS CASH REGRESSION  
4.1.2. DESCRIPTIVES 
With a total average sample size of 826 focused firms, and 358 diversified firms between 2004-
2013, the regression for excess cash has been done each year. Also, since excess cash 
determination is crucial for firm categorization and thus the conclusion for the research, the 
result and summary from the regression is shown in table 1. Annual data is further assigned to 
appendix F for a more extensive visualization.  
TABLE 1: SUMMARY OF ALL VARIABLES IN EXCESS CASH REGRESSION BETWEEN 2004-2013. 
 
Throughout the entire test period of 2004-2013, adjusted R-square obtains explanatory power of 
between 27 percent and 35 percent, which means that independent variables explain about a third 
of the variation in the dependent variable. The coefficients are not further analysed in their 
fullness but rather given by a short summary of interest for further conclusion for this research.  
Common dividends: The regression indicate a significant inverse relationship 8 of 10 years 
between excess cash and dividend payments, where firms that pay dividends also carry less cash.  
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CAPEX: 3 of 10 years show a positive significance between capital expenditure and excess cash, 
which means that firms with high CAPEX also hold more cash.  
Leverage: 7 of 10 years show a significant result that firms with high leverage hold less cash. 
Size: In 3 of 10 years, there is a significantly negative relation between firm size and excess cash, 
which is consistent with prior research that larger firms hold less cash than smaller firms. 
     
NWC: In 6 out of 10 years, there is significance in the Net-Working-Capital ratio as well, 
meaning that firms hold less excess cash if they can substitute it with other liquid assets. 
Market-to-book: 7 of 10 yearly regressions indicate a positive relationship between excess cash 
and Market-to-book value of the firm which indicates that firms with future growth opportunities 
also tend to hold more cash, also consistent with Opler et al (1999). 
Research & Development: 9 out of 10 regressions indicate a positive significance between excess 
cash holding and R&D. A conclusion which also is consistent with Opler et al (1999) prior 
research that firms with larger R&D expenditure also suffer from financing problems due to 
asymmetry information between managers and stakeholders and thus have to retain more cash.  
Firm Strategy: 6 out of 10 regressions indicate a positive relation between focused firm and 
excess cash holding, which is consistent with prior research that focused firms hold more cash 
due to lack of internal capitalization options. This evidently illustrates the importance of the new 
variable in the regression. These results also support Tong (2011) and Duchin (2010) previous 
paper, where the value of excess cash holding was a decreasing function of the grade of 
diversification. 
Cash Flow: 5 out of 10 regression indicate significant inverse relationship between excess cash 
holding and cash flow-to-assets, an implication that firms with higher cash flows also hold less 
cash compared to firms with lower cash flows, a conclusion which actually is the opposite as in 
prior research. 
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Cash flow volatilityindustry specific: In 10 out of 10 years the regressions show that excess cash 
holding has a positive relation with industry-specific volatility. Firms operating in volatile 
industries, thus tend to hold more cash. This conclusion is also consistent with Bates, Kahle and 
Stulz (2009) previous research.  
The F-stats in the regressions are higher than the critical value, thus the null:  
H0: β1=0, β2=0, β3=0, β4=0, β5=0, β6=0, β7=0, β8=0 β9=0 β10=0  is rejected.  
This means that the model as a whole is significant. Furthermore, obtaining the residuals from 
the regression above provides us with information regarding excess cash holdings. Positive 
residuals are equivalent to positive excess cash holding.  
4.1.3. MODIFIED MODEL 
As noted, the initial idea for the use of the model was to obtain the residuals in order to 
distinguish firms with excess cash from firms with less or non-excess cash holdings. With this 
logic, the coefficients per se are irrelevant for this study, as are OLS diagnostic tests for 
normality, multicollinearity, heteroscedasticity. However, since the model is modified with a 
dummy variable for whether a firm is focused or diversified, and this dummy actually improves 
the original model from Opler et al (1999) in terms of adjusted R-squares, some simple 
diagnostic tests are made. These tests should however be seen as intermediate steps before going 
forward with the main purpose of this study – presenting the results from the abnormal stock 
returns. 
4.1.3.1. MULTICOLLINEARITY  
When running regressions with the OLS estimation, one has to check to which extent the 
independent variables are correlated with each other. If some of the variables are highly 
correlated with each other, the regression suffers from multicollinearity (Brooks, 2008). 
Multicollinearity can cause inflated R-square, meaning that the regression as a whole “looks 
good” while the affected coefficients actually have too large standard errors. This can in turn 
cause distortions in the inference (op. cit.). With a simple correlation matrix one can spot near 
multicollinearity, which is when the correlation is 0.8 or more (ibid.). Looking at the correlation 
matrix in appendix E one can see that the highest correlation is 0.436 – the one between firm size 
and the common dividend dummy. Hence, near multicollinearity is in this case not an issue. 
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4.1.3.2. NORMALITY 
To be able to draw any inferences from the regression with assumptions based on the normal 
distribution, the regression has also been tested for normality (ibid.). Appendix D shows the 
normality according to the so-called Bera-Jarque (BJ) test each year’s regression, but similar 
results apply for all years. Skewness measures the extent to which a distribution is skewed about 
its mean value, i.e. the extent of asymmetry about its mean (ibid.). Kurtosis on the other hand, 
measures how fat the tails of the distribution are and how pointy it is at the top. A normal 
distribution has a kurtosis coefficient of 3, which means that the tails of the distribution are too 
fat. This is called a leptokurtic distribution (op. cit). 
All of the regressions exhibit a slight skewness to the left, with a range of between -0.68 and -
1.16 throughout the years. The p-value of the JB test reveals that the null hypothesis of normality 
can be rejected. This non-normality is caused by some extreme residuals in the test, from 
observations that appear in the tails of the distribution, so-called outliers (ibid.). For example, 
most firms in the 2012-year sample had a market-to-book ratio of between 1 and 4 and a mean of 
2.8, while one firm has a market-to-book ratio of 175. This non-normality can be fixed by 
removing the outlier(s) from the sample. However, the total sample in this specific year consists 
of 2 589 firms, and according to Brooks (2008), violations of normality when doing an OLS 
regression, has no consequences for large samples as these. This is due to the central limit 
theorem, which states that the sample mean converges to a normal distribution. 
4.1.3.3. HETEROSCEDASTICITY 
To test for homoscedasticity and ensure that the squared residuals from the OLS regression are 
not related to the independent variables, the Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey (BPG) test for 
heteroscedasticity is used. The F-statistic and P-values in this test indicate that the null 
hypothesis of homoscedasticity can be rejected. Hence, there is a presence of heteroscedasticity 
(Brook, 2008). However, since the purpose in this case is not to draw any inferences from the 
regression, there cannot be any consequences from this heteroscedasticity. A regression with 
robust standard errors is nevertheless given in appendix F.  
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4.2. COMPARISON OF ABNORMAL RETURNS 
4.2.1 FOCUSED WITH EXCESS CASH VS. DIVERSIFIED WITHOUT EXCESS CASH  
As the market premium is being estimated by theoretical and historical assumptions and 
therefore not by real return on the market, further interpretation will only be focusing on the 
degree of differences between portfolio alphas rather than the absolute level of abnormal returns 
for each portfolios. Also, the returns are not compared to the market portfolio S&P500.  
4.2.1.1. PRE-CRISIS PERIOD 2004 - Q2 2007 
Results will subsequently be presented in chronological order, starting with the pre-defined 
period between 2004 and mid 2007, whereas a brief summary of the results for the pre-defined 
crisis period is presented and visualized in Table 2 below. Results for a specific year are further 
presented in appendix B.  
The results for the defined pre-crises period reveal significant differences in the sample 
containing all focused firms with positive residuals received from the excess cash regression and 
all diversified firms with non-positive residuals. Table 2 further describes a significant positive 
added value for investors of diversified firms regarding the abnormal returns, at a 5 percent 
confidence level (two-sided). 
TABLE 2: MEAN ALPHAS FOR ALL FOCUSED FIRMS THAT HOLD EXCESS CASH, COMPARED TO ALL DIVERSIFIED 
FIRMS WITHOUT ANY EXCESS CASH (PRE-CRISIS PERIOD). 
 
Diversified firms as a group obtain an abnormal return of 2.31 percent on average, which can be 
compared to focused firms negative abnormal return of -0.22 percent on average. A suggestion 
that diversified firms in general performed better during the defined time period until the 
beginning of the Financial Crisis. A result, which further implies a certain advantage for internal 
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capitalization above more, focused firms, with larger cash holdings during normal market 
conditions.  
A second question should therefore also be if this superior advantage regarding abnormal returns 
differs between different degrees of diversification towards focused. The answer is to some 
extent yes. Table 2 illustrates a monotonic relation between the grade of diversification, where 
diversified firm with broad product segments i.e. firms with 4-8 SIC codes reveal a positive 
significant abnormal return on the stock market compared to focused. To further visualize the 
relationship, diversified firms with 4-8 SIC codes generates on average an abnormal return of 
4.08 percent which also is approximately 75 percent higher than all diversified firms as a group 
and over 1800 percent better than focused. This fraction might however seem extremely high, 
but should also be considered in light of the low return throughout all average abnormal returns 
during the time period. 
Further on, less diversified firms with 3 SIC codes also uplift significant results below the 5 
percent level and an abnormal return of 3.9 percent on average, firms are practically similar to 
firms with 4-8 SIC codes, but differences in variation make the abnormal return more dispersed 
and sensitive which also explain the lower significance in the sample when compared to focused 
firms. For the least grade of diversification including firms with 2 SIC codes which are those 
firms, that are assumed to be most emulate focused firms, there is no significant differences 
during the time period. In forthcoming samples, insignificant result will not be discussed any 
further since differences between the strategies not are sufficient to make meaningful 
interpretation. Results will nevertheless be publicized in summary tables for transparency 
purpose. 
Due to significant differences in the results between all diversified firms without excess cash as a 
group, and all focused firms with excess cash, the first hypothesis is rejected; 
H0: There is no significant difference in abnormal stock returns between grade of diversified 
firms with no excess cash, and focused single-segment firms with excess cash, during the pre-
crisis period.  
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4.2.1.2. CRISIS PERIOD Q3 2007 – Q1 2009 
In contrast to previous section, Table 3 reveals that an inverse relationship is seen where focused 
firms provide significant better abnormal returns on average compared to diversified firms as a 
group. The result should however not be seen as value creating for their investors, but rather less 
value destroying since both strategies show negative abnormal returns on average throughout the 
crisis. 
TABLE 3: MEAN ALPHAS FOR ALL FOCUSED FIRMS THAT HOLD EXCESS CASH, COMPARED TO ALL DIVERSIFIED 
FIRMS WITHOUT ANY EXCESS CASH (CRISIS PERIOD). 
 
Furthermore, focused firms obtain a mean abnormal return of -35.8 percent on average, which 
may be compared to diversified firms negative abnormal return of -41.4 percent on average, 
when taken as a group. An inverse relation suggests that firms with internal allocation do worse 
than firms with large excess cash holdings and thus in general perform worse during severe 
market conditions when firms are assumed to be more constrained compared to normal states of 
the economy. Results that imply a certain advantage for excess cash holding and also assumes to 
explain why some firms choose to hold large amounts of cash. 
The next question should be similar as previous section if this superior advantage regarding 
abnormal return also differs between different degrees of diversification level towards focused. 
The answer is in this context a yes as well but with the inverse significances. In previous section 
both 4-8 and 3 SIC coded firms provided evidence of differences between the strategies while 2 
SIC coded firms did not. In this context the results show the opposite which means that firms 
who are assumed to be most emulate to focused were the ones that actually did significantly 
worse, which might be explained by deficiency of capacity for internal capital allocation due to 
its two product segments, at the same time as these firms revealed major lacks in excess cash. 
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For firms with 3 or 4-8 different SIC codes, average abnormal returns were less than for focused 
but due to high variation in the sample, no significant differences can be concluded to exist.  
To illustrate the relationship, diversified firms with 2, 3 and 4-8 SIC codes generates on average 
an abnormal return of -46.8 percent, -40.1 percent and -36.3 percent respectively. 
Due to significant differences between all diversified firms without excess cash as a group, and 
focused firms with excess cash, the second hypothesis is rejected; 
H0: There is no significant difference in abnormal stock returns between grade of diversified 
firms with no excess cash, and focused single-segment firms with excess cash, during the crisis 
period  
4.2.1.3. POST-CRISIS PERIOD Q2 2009 – 2013 
Compared to pre-crisis and crisis period, similar results confirm once again significant 
differences between diversified firms as a group and focused. And just like in the pre-crisis 
period, its yet again diversified firms as a group who achieve a significant higher abnormal 
return on average compared to focused firms. As illustrated in table 4 below, diversified firms on 
average gain an abnormal return of 12.84 percent compared to focused 9.42 percent, which again 
implies a certain advantage for internal capitalization above more focused firms with larger cash 
holdings during normal market conditions, i.e. post-crisis.  
However, during the post-crisis period, significant differences can’t be seen for firms with 3 or 
4-8 SIC codes, which is in contrast to the pre-crisis period. Instead the differences turn to firms 
with 2 SIC codes, which are most related to focused firms due to their lack of large segment 
range. Table 4 furthermore illustrate the observed abnormal returns where diversified firms with 
3 or 4-8 SIC codes achieve abnormal returns of 11.26 percent and 11.48 percent respectively 
compared to 2 SIC coded firms abnormal returns of nearly 15.26 percent on average. In contrast 
to focused 9.42 percent, diversified firms with 2 SIC codes nearly outperform focused firm with 
approximately 60 percent during the after crisis period. This result might further on imply a 
problem of carrying large amount of excess cash during stable market conditions and thus invite 
to price discounts on the market due to low market expectations. 
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TABLE 4: MEAN ALPHAS FOR ALL FOCUSED FIRMS THAT HOLD EXCESS CASH, COMPARED TO ALL DIVERSIFIED 
FIRMS WITHOUT ANY EXCESS CASH (POST-CRISIS PERIOD). 
 
What is interesting is that differences in abnormal returns between the two strategies differ 
dependently on market conditions. A result which might imply the inverse relationship with 
previous paper by Rajan, Servaes and Zingales (2000) and Yan, Yang and Jiao (2010), where 
diversified firms during market downturns proved greater efficiency in their capital allocation 
and thus exhibit superior expectations from the market compared to focused firms who are 
assumed to show significant difficulties in external financing during market downturns. This 
problem is on the other hand, according to the literature, smaller in diversified firms due to 
internal capitalization options. A reduction in investments by focused firms will thus result in 
lower market expectations, and hence, reflect itself in the share price.  
Due to significant differences in the result, the third hypothesis is rejected; 
H0: There is no significant difference in abnormal stock returns between grade of diversified 
firms with no excess cash, and focused single-segment firms with excess cash, during the post-
crisis period.  
However, the results show the inverse relation. And the question should be raised if it is due to 
large excess cash. The answer cannot be either yes or no since the conclusion fails under the 
assumption of: “focused firms with large excess cash holdings”, where firms in previous samples 
haven´t been sorted out by the level of excess cash. Instead, they have been divided to this 
portfolio although their excess cash may have proved to be small in comparison to others. This 
surely creates a distortion in the sample since firms with marginal excess cash cannot be seen as 
representatives for the strategy´s purpose, and therefore answer the question if differences can be 
seen between diversified firms and focused firms with large amount of excess cash.  
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In order to provide a more relevant and interesting comparison between firms with large excess 
cash holdings and diversified firms with internal capital allocation, focused firms below the top 
20 percent with excess cash are excluded from the sample. That is, the new way to define large 
excess cash holders is by only including the top 20 % of firms with the most excess cash on their 
balance sheets. These are then compared to firms with different grades of diversification as 
previously. A comparison, that also gives rise to more information regarding the true relationship 
between cash holding and value creation on the market during different states of the economy. 
4.2.2. TOP 20 PERCENT FOCUSED FIRMS WITH MOST EXCESS CASH VS. 
DIVERSIFIED WITHOUT EXCESS CASH  
The top 20 percent of focused single-segment firms that hold the most excess cash includes firms 
such as Choice Hotels International Inc. In 2013, this international hotel chain held cash and 
short-term investments equal to more than 30 percent of total assets. Next, these cash-rich firms 
are compared with diversified firms without any excess cash, to measure investors’ expectations 
on these different firm characteristics. Grade of diversification will again also be taken into 
consideration. 
 
FIGURE 4: AVERAGE YEARLY ALPHAS DURING THE ENTIRE PERIOD 2004-2013 FOR THE TOP 20 % FOCUSED 
FIRMS WITH THE MOST EXCESS CASH HOLDING, RELATIVE ALL DIVERSIFIED FIRMS WITH NO EXCESS CASH. 
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4.2.2.1. PRE-CRISIS PERIOD 2004 - Q2 2007 
TABLE 5: MEAN ALPHAS FOR THE TOP 20 % OF FOCUSED FIRMS THAT HOLDS THE MOST EXCESS CASH 
COMPARED TO DIVERSIFIED FIRMS (PRE-CRISIS PERIOD). 
   
The tests for the entire pre-crisis period of 2004 - mid 2007, show very significant higher mean 
abnormal returns in the portfolio containing diversified firms. As can be seen from the table, 
these results seem monotonic, implying that grade of diversification matters. However, no 
conclusions can be made from the comparison with diversified firms with 2 SIC codes due to 
insignificant difference.  
The significantly higher returns for diversified firms as a whole group are in the years of 2004, 
2006, and the pre-crisis period in Q1-Q2 2007. Hence, these years, diversified firms performed 
better with regards in mean alphas, relative focused firms holding large excess cash. In 2004 
these mean returns were twice as high while in 2006 and in the first half of 2007, focused firms 
experienced negative alphas, in contrast to diversified firms. This indicates a higher value 
creation for investors in diversified firms. The difference between the firms in 2005 is however 
to small to show any significance.   
When splitting up the sample of diversified firms after their grade of diversification, one can see 
significantly better results by the highly diversified firms, i.e. those firms having their segments 
in 4-8 different SIC-codes. These highly diversified firms, conglomerates or “holdings”, seem to 
outperform focused cash-rich firms, with regards to risk-adjusted stock returns, and are thus 
valued higher by investors, during this period.  
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Due to significant differences in the result, the fourth hypothesis is rejected; 
H0: There is no significant difference in abnormal stock returns between grade of diversified 
firms with no excess cash, and the 20 percent largest excess cash holding focused single-segment 
firms, during the pre-crisis period.  
4.2.2.2. CRISIS PERIOD Q3 2007 – Q1 2009 
During the crisis period as defined in chapter three, there are significant results showing that both 
portfolios had large negative abnormal returns, while diversified firms actually experienced a 
worse performance than focused firms with large excess cash holdings. See table 6. These results 
are consistent with the results in the preceding section. Again, grade of diversification seems 
monotonic, however, no conclusions can be made on the difference relative focused firms since 
the test is insignificant. Only the least diversified firms show significantly more negative returns. 
TABLE 6: MEAN ALPHAS FOR THE TOP 20 % OF FOCUSED FIRMS THAT HOLD THE MOST EXCESS CASH 
COMPARED TO DIVERSIFIED FIRMS (CRISIS PERIOD). 
 
During the third quarter of 2007 when the mortgage defaults slowly started to spill over to the 
supply of bank credits, U.S. stock markets started to respond with large declines. This was the 
awakening of the crisis. However, the yearly results indicate that diversified firms actually 
experienced positive mean alphas under this early crisis period while focused firms had negative 
alphas. Thus, one can conclude that diversified firms stock returns were affected later by the 
crisis, in comparison to the focused cash-rich firms. Then, in 2008, financial markets plummeted 
after the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers, which resulted in negative abnormal returns for pretty 
much all of the firms in the sample. Any differences between the firm types are however 
insignificant for this specific year as well, thus it cannot be concluded that there are any 
differences for 2008. Yearly observations are not illustrated, as they are deemed as redundant.   
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In Q1 2009, a period Kuppuswamy et. al. (2010) define as late crisis, diversified firms on the 
other hand experienced significantly worse negative returns.  
Adding these sub-periods up and thus summarizing the whole crisis period as in the table above, 
indicates that diversified firms as a group experienced worse negative abnormal returns than the 
portfolio consisting of focused firms with large excess cash holdings. We can thus conclude that 
investors’ future expectations during this period fell worse for diversified firms, with regards to 
risk-adjusted abnormal returns measured in alphas. Liquidity in focused firms, in the form of 
cash and short-term investments thus seem to have weighted more than internal capital markets 
for investors, during this credit crisis that shook the financial markets. 
Due to significant differences in the result, the fifth hypothesis is rejected; 
H0: There is no significant difference in abnormal stock returns between grade of diversified 
firms with no excess cash and the 20 percent largest excess cash holding focused single-segment 
firms, during the crisis period.  
4.2.2.3. POST-CRISIS PERIOD Q2 2009 – 2013 
TABLE 7: MEAN ALPHAS FOR THE TOP 20 % OF FOCUSED FIRMS THAT HOLDS THE MOST EXCESS CASH 
COMPARED TO DIVERSIFIED FIRMS (POST-CRISIS PERIOD). 
 
Throughout the post-crisis period, there are again significantly higher abnormal returns for all 
diversified firms, in comparison to focused firms with large excess cash holdings. Both firm 
types indicate relatively substantial abnormal returns in Q2 2009 - Q4 2009 after months of great 
turbulence in the stock markets, which can be linked to a general rebound in depressed stock 
prices (CNN Money, 2010).  
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Due to significant differences in the result, the sixth hypothesis is rejected: 
H0: There is no significant difference in abnormal stock returns between grade of diversified 
firms with no excess cash, and the 20 percent largest excess cash holding focused single-segment 
firms, during the post-crisis period.  
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5. ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION 
 
As the previous chapter revealed, there is a significant difference in abnormal returns over all time 
periods, and the variation of strategy advantage tends to move with current market conditions. This 
following chapter will focus on the relevant previous literature and theoretical framework related to the 
subject and context. Thus, the aim is to provide a comprehensive analysis and discussion of the 
differences in abnormal returns between the firms.   
 
5.1. SUMMARY OF RESULTS 
Summarizing the results from the previous chapter:   
• During normal periods, diversified firms as a group seem to outperform focused firms 
with excess cash holdings, measured in abnormal stock returns i.e. alphas. 
• However, during the Financial Crisis in Q3 2007 – Q1 2009 the roles are reversed, and 
cash-rich focused firms manage better mean alphas, although these returns are negative. 
These results are remarkable in a way, since few prior studies have focused on the comparison 
between these corporate strategies and risk-adjusted value creation from the investor perspective. 
Also, an important part of the study is of course the comparison of these absolute risk-adjusted 
returns and how they are changing, contingent on the state of the economy. However, to fully 
understand these results, one has to decompose them and look more closely on what actually is 
being measured and how the level of each category affects the result. The results above reveal 
that firms´ real stock returns have either been higher or lower in regards to their theoretical 
return, based on the systematic risk implied by their betas. The firms that have managed the 
higher mean abnormal returns thus have either higher expectation from the investors, with 
regards to future cash flows. Alternatively, these firms experience relatively lower risk in 
relation to their stock returns. Both these possible reasons are reviewed in the following section.  
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5.2. ANALYSIS OF THE DIFFERENT PERIODS 
 
5.2.1. PRE-CRISIS AND POST-CRISIS PERIODS  
The opinions have been widely discussed in various papers regarding the value-creation from 
these different firm types, making it interesting to compare them. The results in this study proved 
to be significant regardless of the grade of excess cash among the focused firms, i.e. both for all 
focused firms and for the top 20 percent with the most excess cash. Also, the fact that most 
diversified firms exhibit the greatest divergence compared to focused firms in the pre-crisis 
periods proves that the grade of diversification is most relevant for the abnormal returns during 
this period.  
The reason why focused firms with excess cash holdings underperformed relative diversified 
firms during normal periods can potentially be due to the agency problems identified in Jensen 
(1986, 1993). The Free Cash Flow Hypothesis states that firms with large amount of cash may be 
subject to overinvesting and managerial entrenchment, which investors also recognize. Thus, 
according to these results, one can further assume that the investors punish the focused firms 
with large excess cash holdings during these normal market conditions (as can be seen by the 
total negative alphas during the pre-crisis period). During the pre-crisis period, the financial and 
credit markets experienced strong growth, making external financing relatively cheap (Rudolph 
et. al., 2010). It is in these normal periods with low cash flow volatility that managers have the 
greatest incentives to postpone investments (Kisser, 2013). Thus, investors might prefer a payout 
of cash as one-time dividends, alternatively stock repurchases, instead of seeing firms stacking 
cash. As the descriptive statistics in the previous chapter revealed, firms with more excess cash 
also tend to pay out smaller dividends on average (even when size is accounted for), which 
indicates that these assumptions could hold. And since focused firms also seem to hold both 
more cash and pay out fewer dividends compared to diversified firms, this might indicate a 
favour for internal capital allocation. Thus large excess cash reserves during normal times, can 
be harmful to the firm, as Harford et. al. (2003) states, which then is reflected in firms´ stock 
returns. Excess cash can of course also signal low growth options and lack of valuable 
investment opportunities. And the quality and volatility of these investment opportunities can 
have a great impact on the value shareholders place on firms’ excess cash (Pinkowitz et. al. 
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2006). After all, the stock markets valuation of excess cash reflects their expectations on how the 
cash will be used (Frésard and Salva, 2009) 
Alternatively, excess cash can signal managers belief that harder times awaits the firm, and 
money must be stacked in accordance to the precautionary motive. This would further imply 
opportunity costs of investing cash in more valuable projects instead of having them as cash and 
short-term investments on the balance sheet. These firms can also be a subject to greater 
uncertainty, in accordance to Bates et. al. (2009), i.e. their idiosyncratic risk is higher due to lack 
of diversification, which gives them no choice but to build these reserves. A great part of the 
negative impact on stock returns may of course be linked to corporate governance, which also 
affects investors view on excess cash, since they put a lower value on cash holdings in firms with 
bad corporate governance (Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith, 2005) However, these are merely 
assumptions since corporate governance hasn´t been studied in this research. In summary, the 
investors have many reasons to doubt these firms, and this is reflected in firms´ stock returns. 
One can assume that this applies even more for the 20 % with the most excess cash, since they 
are the ones with really large cash holdings.  
Nevertheless, investors earned significantly higher abnormal returns from stocks in diversified 
firms under normal periods. This implies that when entire diversified firms are taken as units, 
and not compared by their segments as in the diversification discount literature, they are 
successful firms that can create abnormal returns for their shareholders. One has to remember 
that a large number of the firms in the sample, especially the ones that operate in many segments 
(4-8), are large corporate holdings. These are characterized by their great success in managing 
subsidiaries and divisions, which makes management and administration their key strengths 
(Koller et. al. 2010). Among large firms, they are actually considered as more valuable; on 
average they represent 75 % of the market value on S&P 500 (Hund, et. al., 2012). However, 
there is another potential explanation for their outperformance, which is linked to their 
diversification discount and the eroded skewness in stock returns.  
5.2.1.1. REDUCED SKEWNESS  
The diversification discount literature argues that the segments of the diversified firms are traded 
at a discount relative focused single-segment peers. With the help of the reduced skewness 
argument in Lamont and Polk (2001) and Mitton and Vorkink (2010), this can be assumed as a 
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possible explanation for the diversified firms´ higher abnormal returns. Accordingly, one of the 
reasons for the diversification discount is due to investors’ requirement for higher stock returns 
from these firms as a compensation for their lower up side potential. The skewness coefficient 
explained in chapter two is thus lower in diversified firms implying that there is a less up side 
potential for extreme stock gains in these firms. The implication would be, that this skewness 
coefficient decreases the more diversified the firm gets, which is consistent with the results in 
this study, i.e. highly diversified firms (4-8 SIC codes) are the ones that on average outperform 
the most, at least in the pre-crisis and crisis period. However, the results seem to be inconsistent 
with the post-crisis period where lesser diversification means higher abnormal returns.   
5.2.2. FINANCIAL CRISIS Q2 2007 – Q1 2009 
This next question discusses how these variations are analysed during more unpredictable and 
apprehensive market conditions, when both firm types theoretically have their benefits. During 
the beginnings of the Financial Crisis in 2007, one can assume that stock prices included all the 
different motives for diversification and excess cash holdings presented in chapter two; 
transactions motive, precautionary motive, internal capital markets motive, debt co-insurance 
motive, et cetera. Based on the results, it seems that the motives for excess cash have prevailed 
the motives for diversification during the crisis. This is in accordance to Opler et. al. (1999) and 
others, who expect that the motives for excess cash holdings are the greatest during uncertain 
times.  
However, any significant differences between diversified firms without excess cash, and focused 
firms with excess cash holdings, are to be regarded as inconsistent with Modigliani (1961). 
Modigliani argues that excess cash holding is irrelevant due to expectations of frictionless 
financial market. One can state that any assumptions of frictionless financial markets fail to exist 
in the fundamental phase of this research. As figure 5 reveals, market conditions under the crisis 
period proved to be the inverse of what Modigliani implied.  
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FIGURE 5: THE SPREAD BETWEEN A 3-MONTH LIBOR (I.E. THE INTERBANK INTEREST RATE) AND THE YIELD ON A 
3-MONTH TREASURY BILL. 
With a noticeable decline in the supply of external capital, firms with insufficient excess cash 
and firms without internal capital allocation opportunities are assumed to suffer the most damage 
seen from the investor's perspective during the crisis. Managers are aware of this, which can help 
explain the upward slope in the cash-to-asset ratio in recent years as illustrated in appendix A.  
Likewise are the propositions from Cossin and Hricko (2000), which are assumed to be relevant 
even for this research, namely that information asymmetry and uncertainty is assumed to be the 
greatest during market periods of crisis, as in Q3 2007 - Q1 2009. This would further on create 
misevaluations and mispricings, which can make external financing even more expensive due to 
a misprice premium.  
Going back to the results, one can assume that the crisis was expected to have a lesser impact on 
the future cash flows of focused firms with excess cash. Reasons for this might include real 
options that give these firms a more favourable situation for investing their way out of the crisis. 
Simutin (2010) argues that this is intuitively expected from firms with large excess cash 
holdings. However, he concludes that the firms with the most cash actually perform the worst 
during the crisis and explains this with a reduction of the value in excess cash firms´ future 
growth options in periods of crisis. Although, it is not entirely correct to compare these results 
with the ones in his study, since he measures the difference in stock returns for the firms with the 
most excess cash relative those with the least excess cash. Thus, he does not make the distinction 
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of diversified and focused firms. However, actually a subsequent test was made where a 
comparison between focused firms with the most excess cash and focused firms with the least 
excess cash. The reason for this was to see if excess cash had its implications on the within-
group abnormal stock returns for the focused firms, and if similar results as in Simutin (2010) 
could be provided. The results revealed that the ones with the most excess cash outperformed 
firms with the least. Thus, this is an indication of the impact on abnormal stock returns from 
having large excess cash during normal periods. This subsequent test proved the arguments in 
Simutin (2010), that excess cash is valuable for stock returns during normal periods. However, 
this subsequent test isn´t linked to the research purpose, thus it will not be further discussed.    
Alternatively, the abnormal returns reflect the findings from Harford et. al. (2003), which state 
that large cash reserves can be beneficial in downturns, due to firms´ higher investing during and 
immediately following the downturn. Thus, this opens the question how capital spending actually 
changed between 2006-2009 for this sample of firms. See Figure 6. 
 
 
FIGURE 6: MEAN CAPITAL EXPENDITURE IN RELATION TO NET ASSETS FOR BOTH FIRM TYPES. 
The figure shows that diversified firms without any excess cash experienced a decline in capital 
expenditures, while all focused firms with excess cash could increase their expenditures, 
compared to the pre-crisis year of 2006. It can be assumed that investors expected this increase 
in late 2007 when the crisis increased in magnitude, causing a smaller decrease in stock returns 
for the sample of focused firms. This lies on the assumption of efficient capital markets and 
investors’ ability to evaluate stocks, as discussed in chapter three. Diversified firms enjoy the 
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advantage of asset redeployability between segments, which can of course have an impact on 
their capital expenditure. However, as mentioned in the method chapter, unrelated diversification 
has been the main purpose of study, implying that asset redeployability is harder in these firms.   
Also, any conclusions from these capital expenditures on the abnormal stock returns only hold 
for diversified firms operating in 2 SIC codes and diversified firms as a group, since other 
categories provide insignificant results compared to focused firms.   
A possible implication might furthermore be connected to better internal capital allocation for 
more diversified firms. The results in this case are fairly ambiguous; if focused firms are equated 
with highly diversified firms i.e. firms with four to eight SIC codes and diversified firms with 
three SIC codes, the results are insignificant. This result holds regardless of focused firms 
magnitude of excess cash holdings, i.e. when firms with the top 20 % excess cash holders. At the 
same time can a positive function of the grade of diversification relatively focused firms be seen, 
where the differences between the strategies decreases notably with increasing level of SIC 
codes, resulting in significant differences between diversified firms as a group and company with 
only two SIC codes relative focused. Furthermore, should the correlation between the levels of 
diversification and focused firms also be highlighted, where the correlation also is believed to 
have a significant influence on the abnormal returns generated by the firms. As the results imply 
a significantly better abnormal returns on average for firms with higher grade of diversification, 
i.e. more SIC codes relatively less diversified. Compared to focused firms, no differences can be 
seen between fully diversified firms and focused firm as mentioned, but as the grade of 
diversification also decrease, insignificant differences between focused firms and diversified 
firms also decrease significantly and finally disappear completely. This certainly shows that 
internal capital allocation is far more widespread and effective the more diversified the firm is 
relatively different SIC-codes.  
5.2.2.1. DIVERSIFICATION DISCOUNT DURING CRISIS 
Finally, as previously discussed, segments in diversified firms trade at a discount compared to 
their focused peers, due to managers overinvestment in unprofitable projects and cross-
subsidization to weaker segments within the group. During the Financial Crisis, this discount 
was reduced with 7-9 percent implying that diversified firms gained value thanks to their internal 
capital market and larger debt capacity, as according to Kuppuswamy et. al., (2010). However, it 
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is hard to draw any conclusion about the diversification discount based on the results in this 
study, since diversified firms are compared in their risk-adjusted stock returns, and not on what 
their segments would have been worth as stand-alone focused firms. This value-enhancement 
can have been a reality during the crisis, as stated in Kuppuswamy et. al. (2010). However, it has 
not been enough for diversified firms to have total higher abnormal stock returns than focused 
firms with excess cash. Nevertheless, this makes it interesting to see how leverage, one of the 
contributing factors for this value-enhancement, has changed in the two firms groups between 
the years27. See figure 7. 
 
 
FIGURE 7: MEAN LEVERAGE AS SHORT TERM DEBT + LONG TERM DEBT RELATIVE TOTAL ASSETS FOR BOTH 
FIRM TYPES. 
The figure illustrates that both focused firms and diversified firms increased their leverage 
during 2007-2008 but decreased it in 2009. It seems hard to draw any general conclusions from 
this, but since diversified firms seem to have a higher leverage, one can conclude that debt 
capacity through co-insurance effect is a great advantage for diversified firms28 as previous 
research states (e.g. Lewellen, 1971; Hann Ogneva and Ozbas, 2009). Also, debt has a 
disciplinary role, which can contribute to greater capital efficiency. Also, enjoying higher credit 
ratings, diversified firms are less likely to miss out on investment opportunities, when there is a 
contraction in credit markets. Higher leverage eventually also means higher shareholder value, 
                                                
27 The other factor according to Kuppuswamy et al. (2010) is as mentioned earlier the activity in internal capital markets 
However, deriving and illustrating the activity in internal capital markets is above the scope of this thesis. 
28 These mean leverage levels for diversified firms are almost identical when measuring it for all diversified firms, including 
diversified firms with excess cash. 
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due to the tax shield component. However, higher leverage must also have an impact on the 
riskiness of the firm, see figure 8.  
 
 
FIGURE 8: MEAN BETA THROUGHOUT THE YEARS FOR TOP 20 % OF FOCUSED WITH THE MOST EXCESS CASH 
AND ALL DIVERSIFIED FIRMS WITHOUT EXCESS CASH. 
Higher leverage has a direct impact on stock returns, as mentioned in section 2.3.2. about TRS. 
The changes in beta for the firm stocks are not especially radical due to the crisis (note the lag 
between beta change and the crisis since beta is calculated from the monthly returns preceding 
the beta value). However, as one can see from the figure, they are consistently higher for 
diversified firms. The figure can at first sight seem inconsistent with the previous statements that 
diversified firms have a lower systematic risk and thus a lower cost of capital (Hann, et. al., 
2009). However, this is because figure 8 above simply illustrates mean alphas for diversified 
firms as whole firms. The co-insurance literature on the other hand, compares diversified firms 
with portfolios of stand-alone focused firms much in the same way as the diversification discount 
literature; what the systematic risk and thus cost of capital would have been if the diversified 
firm was a portfolio of focused firms. 
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6.  CONCLUSIONS 
 
Based on previous research, a distinction is made between diversified firms that operate in 
different segments, and focused single-segment firms that stack excess cash. Both diversification 
and excess cash holding can have positive effects on firm value during a credit crisis. In this 
study, these firms are divided into different portfolios with regards to grade of diversification and 
excess cash, in order to measure and compare their performance on the stock markets, using risk-
adjusted stock returns in the form of Jensen´s Alpha. These returns are measured cross-
sectionally under both normal periods, and under the Financial Crisis in 2007-2009 in order to 
spot any differences between the firms. The Financial Crisis had a great impact on both corporate 
credits and corporate stock returns, thus, making it interesting to see which firms performed the 
best on the U.S. stock markets.  
The main results indicate that diversified firms outperform focused firms with excess cash 
holdings as a whole under normal periods, while the opposite holds for the crisis period between 
Q3 2007 and Q1 2009. However, this only holds for less diversified firms with 2 SIC codes, 
where no significant differences can be seen between diversified firms with more than 3 SIC 
codes and focused firms with excess cash. It is concluded that lower positive skewness, which 
according to the literature helps explain the diversification discount, can be a contributing factor 
for these higher abnormal returns for diversified firms during normal periods. Also, higher 
leverage in accordance to the co-insurance motive can have its impact as well. On the other hand, 
under the Financial Crisis, the liquidity cushion in cash-rich focused firms and their higher 
capital expenditures, provides these firms with higher abnormal returns, implying that the value 
in excess cash can be increased in times of credit constraints. 
 
6.1. THEORETICAL AND PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS 
The results presented in this study add to the rich existent literature in diversification and excess 
cash, but from an investor and capital market perspective. It is shown how abnormal stock 
returns in these firm categories are contingent to the state of the economy, or more specifically, 
the state of the financial and credit systems. Moreover, it shows that investor’s aren´t better of by 
liquidity in the form of excess cash in times of crisis, compared to a widespread internal capital 
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markets. During the Financial Crisis, any significant differences in safest investment for 
investors cannot be seen since both diversified firms with 3 and 4-8 SIC codes provide 
insignificant differences compared to focused firms. What can be said is however, that investors 
were slightly safer in focused firms with large cash holdings, than in less diversified firms with 2 
SIC codes and no excess cash. This possibly gives an added explanation for the increasing cash-
to-asset ratio in past years by U.S. firms, and supports the precautionary motive for excess cash. 
However, it also exhibits a possible explanation why firms go widespread in different product 
segments and thus create value through internal capital allocation options.  
For normal market conditions, this study reaffirms the diversification discount as a reason for 
higher stock returns in diversified firms, even when taking into account for the systematic risk, 
as has been the case here. Thus, diversified firms provide higher abnormal returns during normal 
periods, which makes them attractive for investors.   
Finally, the modified excess cash model with the dummy variable presented in the previous two 
chapters, reaffirms what previous research has stated; focused firms do hold significantly more 
cash than diversified firms.  
6.2. POTENTIAL WEAKNESSES IN STUDY 
The division of firms in portfolios containing diversified firms and focused firm with excess 
cash, has been made with regards to their different characteristics. This comes from the fact that 
the excess cash regression defines firms that hold more cash than needed for their daily 
operations, based on their size, industry volatility, leverage, current assets, dividends, et cetera. 
Thus, it is not just a simple constant cash-to-asset ratio that applies to all firms in the sample, but 
the regression takes into consideration these different factors. Also, the smallest firms with 
annual sales of less than $20 million are excluded from the sample, which further reduces any 
biasedness from firm size. However, going back to table 1 in chapter four, one can notice that a 
few of the factors are considerably different between focused and diversified firms. For example, 
the average market-to-book ratio is twice as high among the focused firms, which implies that 
the market has higher future expectations on focused firms. This further implies that on average, 
these firms are valued relatively higher than diversified firms, and thus, they may have a hard 
time increasing their stock returns. They can for example, in a greater range, run on the so-called 
Expectations Treadmill. This expression is used in Koller et. al. (2010) and means that firms 
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who´s stock returns is valued high, have a hard time keeping up in regards to an increase in stock 
prices. The future expectations on these firms may very well already be priced in, thus managers 
run on an expectations treadmill, which goes faster and faster, due to higher and higher 
expectations. Hence, the sample of focused firms may have a harder time to realize abnormal 
stock returns due to relatively higher existing stock prices. Investing in a successful firm is not 
the same as investing in a successful stock29 (ibid.).  
Another potential weakness in this study is that it doesn´t take into consideration excess cash 
firms actual behaviour during the crisis period, i.e. the possibility that some firms perhaps chose 
to diversify in the crisis periods through acquisitions in non-core segments. These firms are then 
defined as focused in say, late 2008, when they perhaps have been diversified since early 2008. 
This then causes a risk of biasness in the conclusions made about the different firms.   
Finally, stock betas for the post-crisis period, can be subject to an upwards bias, since they are 
calculated with the help of stock returns from the extreme crisis period. For example, a firm’s 
beta in 2011 includes monthly stock returns from 2006-2010. However, this was the most severe 
financial crisis and the one with the most impact on stock markets since the Great Depression. At 
first sight, this ought to have the same implications for all of the firms in the sample since their 
beta is calculated with the same market index. Still, there is a potential risk that it has greater 
impact on some of the stocks, i.e. some of them could have experienced a much greater volatility 
during the crisis period. Also, one has to remember that these abnormal returns depend on the 
systematic risk only, whereas the whole risk including the idiosyncratic risk in the form of stock 
volatility is excluded. Thus, it is assumed that investors are rational and invest in fully diversified 
portfolios of stocks.  
6.3. FURTHER RESEARCH 
For further research, interesting viewpoints would be to see if these results are consistent with 
firms in Europe, where there are other characteristics in the credit system. The usage of corporate 
bonds has historically been relatively less developed in Europe. Especially firms in continental 
Europe are traditionally more bank-dependent than U.S. firms, which may have influenced them 
                                                
29 And of course, in the real world, stock returns are affected by many different factors, as investors sometimes simply act 
irrationally. Investors´ attention, mood and experience are said to have a large impact on their trading. For example, during 
perfectly sunny days the annualized market return in New York City is 24.8 % per year, compared to 8.7 % per year during 
perfectly cloudy days (Berk and DeMarzo, 2011). 
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differently throughout this credit crisis. What previous research also has found is that corporate 
governance structure can have a significant influence on a company's value-creation. However 
this factor has not been taken into consideration in this thesis, which consequently opens the 
question, as to whether differences in corporate governance also can help explain the differences 
in abnormal returns during crisis years when agency costs are assumed to change. Finally, 
previous research has also found that firms divesting non-core assets (i.e. refocusing) can 
generate greater value for its shareholders. A possible research question and interesting 
perspective would be to find out if firms who perform better during different market conditions 
in regards to abnormal returns, also divest more efficiently compared to less performing firms.  
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APPENDIX A 
 
 
FIGURE 9: AVERAGE ANNUAL CASH-TO-ASSET RATIOS FOR FOCUSED AND DIVERSIFIED NONFINANCIAL AND 
NONUTILITY FIRMS, WITH MARKET CAPITALIZATION OF $10 M OR MORE (DUCHIN, 2010). 
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APPENDIX B 
TABLE 8: SUMMARY TABLES (2004-2013) FOR THE MEAN ALPHAS OF ALL FOCUSED FIRMS WITH EXCESS CASH 
COMPARED WITH ALL DIVERSIFIED FIRMS WITH NO EXCESS CASH 
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APPENDIX C 
 
TABLE 9: ALL RELEVANT VARIABLES AND THEIR RESPECTIVE CODES IN THOMSON REUTERS DATASTREAM ®. 
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APPENDIX D 
 
TABLE 10: NORMALITY TEST AND DESCRIPTIVE DATA FOR RESIDUALS FOR EACH YEAR IN THE EXCESS CASH 
REGRESSION. 
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APPENDIX E 
 
TABLE 11: CORRELATION TABLE FOR ALL VARIABLES IN EXCESS CASH REGRESSION FOR EACH YEAR AS AN 
ILLUSTRATION OF NON-MULTICOLLINEARITY. 
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APPENDIX F 
 
TABLE 12: ILLUSTRATION OF EXCESS CASH REGRESSION WITH HETEROSCEDASTICITY-ROBUST STANDARD 
ERRORS 
 
 
